THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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'LOVE REJOICETH WITH THE TRUTH'*

By Canon Quick, M.A. (Oxon.), Hon. D.D. (St. Andrew's), Canon of Durham Cathedral and Professor of Divinity in Durham University.

LAST Sunday morning my subject was the recently published Report of the Archbishops' Commission on Doctrinal Unity. To-day I would say a little more on one of the broader issues raised by the Report, an issue which is perhaps of special importance in a place where the Church's life is as closely linked with that of a University as it is here in Durham.

How is loyalty to the Christian revelation reconcilable with intellectual freedom in the quest of truth? The question indicates a problem which takes many shapes, some of them very definite and practical. A Christian scholar, for example, may be perplexed by the doubt whether it is or is not his duty to publish some conclusion or hypothesis which appears to his candid judgment to be probably true, whereas he knows that its publication must cause pain or even offence to many of his fellow-believers. This is an obvious illustration of the way in which perplexity of conscience may arise. But behind all such particular difficulties is a question about those more fundamental principles which ought to govern all Christian thought and action. A Christian as such stands pledged to a particular faith. And he also owes to truth an absolute allegiance. But does not the pledge to a particular faith necessarily interfere with the

* Sermon preached in Durham Cathedral, January 30th, 1938.

complete freedom and open-mindedness necessary to the pursuit of truth? It is worth while to examine briefly how it is that that question has come to constitute such a specially acute problem for the modern mind.

The New Testament, on the surface, appears to ignore the problem altogether. It simply affirms that Christ and the truth are one, and does not consider the possibility of any even apparent conflict between loyalty to the one and loyalty to the other. Indeed, in the New Testament 'the truth' means simply the Christ-revealed reality of the universe. It makes no allowance for the possibility that man's very truthfulness may make him sceptical concerning the truth which is its gospel. 'Freedom,' again, in the New Testament is regarded simply as Christ's gift to man. Nothing is said of any conceivable value in any other freedom of the mind. Christ and His gospel are the truth; and it is they alone which make men free.

So the Church carried the gospel of Christ's truth out into the world, and, under pressure of questionings and controversies, it defined and safeguarded it by dogma, taking it for granted that the honest man of goodwill must be led to accept its creeds. Afterwards, in the great theological works of the Middle Ages, the truth of the Christian revelation was combined in a philosophical system with the data of natural science and of secular knowledge. Thus the authority of the Church was extended over a widening area. Yet still it was held that to question the Church's dogma was to exhibit moral or spiritual defeat, and such questioning was regarded as an offence meriting the severest penalties.

Then, in the centuries which followed the Reformation and the Renaissance, a profound change took place in European culture. Art and science and secular philosophy more and more completely threw off the yoke of ecclesiastical and religious control. The whole world of human thought, knowledge and experience was split up into autonomous departments; it became no longer one, but many. The result was that in the nineteenth century the notion of the truth as a securely apprehended system of knowledge about ultimate reality was generally abandoned, outside a comparatively narrow circle of orthodoxy. For the authority of *the truth* men substituted an ideal of *truth*: that is

to say, they acknowledged themselves bound to be honest seekers after whatever the truth might turn out to be, while resolutely refusing all foregone conclusions as to what it is. They went back, as it were, from Christ to Socrates.

So in the civilized world the dominant ideals of culture and the whole method of education were transformed. The mind of man in the last few generations has been more and more stimulated and encouraged, not to learn and re-interpret a securely established truth concerning the nature of things, but rather to press on to discover for itself what the nature of things may be, rigorously criticizing all traditional doctrines in every field. We have taken infinite pains to awaken, even in those who are never likely to make original contributions to the subject of their study, the spirit of free independent search : we have striven to impart, even to the learning of an alphabet the atmosphere of a voyage of discovery. And we have constantly emphasized the right and duty of experts to be absolutely untrammelled in enquiry, to take nothing for granted, and to assume no conclusions except such hypotheses as seem likely in their own judgment to help them to fresh knowledge. In a changing world teachers and learners have alike accustomed themselves to conceive of reality itself as something wherein new discoveries may indefinitely alter and supersede all that is at present known. Alike in the intellectual and moral and spiritual sphere we have been offered and accepted the new lamp of adventure for the old lamp of security. The very word dogma has come to mean, not something guaranteed as true, but something which is almost certainly not true at all.

But now within the present generation another quite new and opposite tendency is showing itself. Men have wearied of the ideal of unrestricted freedom, which seemed to be leading, after all, not to glorious adventure, but to chaos. New and mutually opposed authorities, not the Christian Church, are seeking to control men's minds with the new kinds of dogma called ideologies, and they are using all the apparatus of modern science and its technique in order to impress their teachings indelibly upon the masses. Education is becoming as never before a means of inculcating upon the young a particular set of beliefs and convictions. There seems to be much reason for thinking that the

ideal of the untrammelled search for truth, which in the last century seemed to be a new dawn, was in fact only the after-glow following the sunset of mediaeval faith; and that we must now prepare ourselves to enter a new dark age in which the weapons of barbarism will be the latest products of the scientific laboratory.

God grant it may not be so. But if indeed it be true that intellectual liberalism, with its ideal of freedom, is in large measure the child of Christian orthodoxy, a child which has quarrelled with its parent, there is all the more reason why both parties to the dispute should seek to consider afresh how far their apparent opposition is due to mutual misunderstanding.

What does loyalty to truth, or love of truth, as liberalism understands it, really mean? What does it require of the mind, what does it postulate concerning reality? Free thinkers have sometimes spoken as though it made no postulates at all. But there they are certainly mistaken. In the first place, it demands resolute self-discipline of the mind; for no one supposes that the universe unlocks its secrets to gratify the casual curiosity of the amateur. Then secondly, even the most disinterested and independent seeker, if he is to have keenness to persevere in face of difficulty and disappointment, must already possess the conviction, not merely that truthfulness is a duty, but that there does exist a truth which is worth loving and seeking. Pessimism is an impossible faith for an enquirer; for he must assign very positive value to the reality after which he enquires. Though he knows not yet what the reality is, he must yet know, in a sense, that it is very good. Otherwise the zeal of his enquiry will slacken, the high spirit of his adventure will give way, as it has given way lately among so many, to the doubt whether the road he travels leads anywhere at all. A man may spend all his powers searching into the constitution and origins of man or life or matter, and have no preconceived idea of what he may or must discover. Yet through it all he must believe, and cling to his faith, that man or life or matter is a wonderful and excellent thing, so that to enquire into its nature is a worthy task for human energy. He must also believe that the order of the universe is such as to make the truth not only worth discovering but also, in the long run, discoverable. Enormous assumptions these; but liberalism must make them or perish. 'Seek, and ye shall

find; knock, and it shall be opened to you.' We seem to be not such a very long way from the Gospels after all.

But if it is true that liberalism postulates a more definite faith than it has often been ready to admit, it is also true that orthodoxy has often been slow to recognize some of the implications of its creed. It has not been strong enough to rest in the assurance that the truth revealed in Christ, because it is ultimate and unassailable, must in the end be illuminated by every enquiry honestly undertaken and carried through. And if the Christian understands the full meaning of the Cross, it ought surely to be no matter for surprise or alarm to him if the first results of such enquiries should sometimes be to cast doubt on certain traditional doctrines or beliefs. The application of the Cross in the sphere of intellect is perhaps the part of Christian doctrine which most of all needs fresh consideration. What is that application? It needs indeed a self-denial to learn and recognize facts for what they are. It is only by accepting painful, irksome and limiting truths that we ultimately attain to the truth that makes us free. But the gospel of the Cross becomes the very ground and inspiration of free enquiry, if only it is seen to demand that high and difficult faith which is willing to suffer in learning all things about the world because it knows that that self-submission is but one form of the self-sacrifice by which Christ saves mankind. Christ loved the world as God's, in spite of all its evil, because He knew it fundamentally, and knew it as it is. We doubt God because we have only scratched a little below the surface of the world in order to satisfy ourselves, and are frightened by what we find. We cannot walk to Jesus over the waters of modern knowledge because, like Peter, we are afraid. Sometimes, we must recognize, it is lack of courage which prevents the orthodox from keeping the faith whole and undefiled. They prefer to wrap the talent of revealed truth in a napkin lest they lose their treasure in dangerous markets by unskilful trade. But they forget that Christianity, and nothing else, is its own most searching critic; and that by trying to keep their dogmas safe from all criticism they are seeking to divide the one Spirit of the living God.

Do not misunderstand me. I am not seeking to prejudge a single question which at present is at issue between what is called

orthodoxy and what is called modernism in the Church. I am only trying to suggest the temper of mind in which such a document as the Report of the Archbishops' Commission ought to be read and criticized. Granted that it tries to offer an irenicon between traditionalism and modern ideas, and in that effort would allow differences of doctrinal opinion within the Church; it ought not for that reason to be dismissed off-hand as an unworthy compromise. What is a compromise, and what is really unworthy of the Spirit of Him we serve? Let us remember at least that His gospel has as little need of our conservatism to keep it safe as it has of our enlightenment to make it pure. And our own need is only to receive from Him a fuller measure of that love which being kind, long-tempered, hoping and enduring all things, will in the end lead us not only to see the truth but also to rejoice with it.

MIGUEL DE UNAMUNO AS A RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHER

By the Rev. T. Hyslop, M.A.

DON Miguel de Unamuno y Jugo, chief of the Spanish intellectuals, a Basque by race, was born at Bilbao on September 29th, 1864, and died at Salamanca on the last day of 1936. During his life he (who continuously preached violent conflict as the only remedy for the spiritual stagnation of his fellow countrymen) experienced two civil wars: he died amid the turmoil of the present tragic struggle and, when he was ten years old, his native town was besieged and bombarded in the second Carlist war. In 1880 he went as a student to the University of Madrid, and in 1891 he began that long connection (which lasted for the remainder of his life) with the University of Salamanca. In this latter year he was appointed Professor of Greek, and in 1900 he became Rector. Immediately on securing a professorial chair he began publishing his political views and, being by nature unusually contentious, he speedily earned wide unpopularity. Belonging himself to no party (although he con-

fessed to an 'invincible platonic distrust of democracies'), he attacked all parties. In 1923, when General Primo de Rivera made his *coup d'état*, Unamuno refused to submit to the new dictatorship, and was accordingly exiled to Fuerteventura, one of the Canary Islands. He was pardoned after a few months, but he remained a voluntary exile in France until the General's fall from power. On his return to Spain he was re-elected to the Rectorship of Salamanca and granted arrears of salary. When the present civil war broke out, he sided with General Franco. The Government thereupon issued an order for his deprivation but, since Salamanca was in Nationalist territory, the order remained inoperative. He was retained at his post until, contentious as ever, he began to direct his criticisms at the Nationalist cause. He was then deprived by General Franco. He died in disgrace and, in spite of his notoriously anti-Catholic views, he received a Catholic burial.

As a poet, novelist, essayist, philosopher and classical scholar, Unamuno acquired in Spain, according to Mr. Ernest Boyd, a position 'analogous to that of Croce in Italy, Bergson in France, or Tolstoy in Russia.'[1] He could read sixteen languages, and he learnt Danish especially in order to study the writings of Kierkegaard, by whom he was much influenced. His chief work was a commentary (originally published in 1905) upon Cervantes' life of Don Quixote. This famous story Unamuno regarded as a sort of parable which sets forth, although Cervantes may have been unconscious of the fact, the essential philosophy of life of the Spanish people. And this philosophy of life (also voiced by the great mystics of Spain) Unamuno made his own. Other important works by him which proclaim this same philosophy are *The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Peoples* (originally published in 1912) and *The Agony of Christianity* (written during his voluntary exile in France). All these three works have been translated into English. In 1925 Mr. Crawford Flitch translated and edited a selection of Unamuno's philosophical writings, entitled *Essays and Soliloquies*.

[1] *The Agony of Christianity*. Trans. by Pierre Loving. Introduction by Ernest Boyd. (Payson and Clarke, Ltd. New York. 1928.) p. 7.

Unamuno, like a certain number of thinkers in all ages and like a great number of thinkers in the present age, was a sceptic: that is to say, he felt more keenly than most of his fellow men the tremendous tragedy of life sometimes metaphorically called the conflict between heart and head, between desire and intellect. According to him, life (which, in order to be tolerable, must have an ultimate meaning) can only have such a meaning if God exists and if we are immortal: but reason can furnish us with no demonstrable proofs for the existence of God or a future life. Desire says Yes and intellect says No. Hence the human predicament which is experienced at various degrees by most, if not by all of the human race.

> '"Is there?" "Is there not?"—these are the bases of our inner life. There may be a rationalist who has never wavered in his conviction of the mortality of the soul, and there may be a vitalist who has never wavered in his faith in immortality; but at the most this would only prove that just as there are natural monstrosities, so there are those who are stupid as regards heart and feeling, however great their intelligence, and those who are stupid intellectually, however great their virtue. But, in normal cases, I cannot believe those who assure me that never, not in a fleeting moment, not in the hours of direct loneliness and grief, has this murmur of uncertainty breathed upon their consciousness. I do not understand those men who tell me that the prospect of the yonder side of death has never tormented them, that the thought of their own annihilation never disquiets them.'[2]

But Unamuno was not only a sceptic with a shrewd suspicion that at least most of his fellow men (whatever religion or lack of religion they profess) are really sceptics too: he was also an intense individualist. Every man born into the world is unique, and it is therefore impossible to put him into any class. When asked to what religion or philosophy he adhered, whether he was a Catholic, or a Protestant, or an atheist, Unamuno replied,

> 'I do not wish to have myself labelled, for I, Miguel de Unamuno, like every other man who aspires to full consciousness, am a unique species. "There are no diseases, but only persons who are diseased," some doctors say, and I say that there are no opinions, but only opining persons.'[3]

This being so, everyone must tackle the human predicament, the conflict between heart and head, in his own way. And

[2] *The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Peoples.* Trans. by J. E. Crawford Flitch. Introductory Essay by Salvador de Madariaga. (Macmillan & Co. London. 1926.) p. 119.

[3] *Essays and Soliloquies.* Trans. by J. E. Crawford Flitch. (Alfred A. Knopf. New York. 1925.) pp. 156-157.

since Unamuno thought it perhaps the chief part of his life's mission to be, like Giordano Bruno, an awakener of sleeping souls, he sometimes seemed to care less that his contemporaries should satisfactorily solve the predicament than that they should be fully conscious of it, that they should know to the full the agony of living.

But he himself had a solution and, as he tells us, it was similar to the solution of Pascal, and Kierkegaard, and William James. Pascal, realizing that reason must be laughed at, that it is necessary to make a fool of oneself (*il faut s'abêtir*) in order to gain eternal salvation, made his famous wager. Kierkegaard affirmed that faith must crucify reason, that it must be like a kind of desperate *sortie*. William James told us not to stifle our will to believe. And Unamuno proclaimed that, although it is impossible during our life upon earth to know for certain the nature of ultimate reality, or even if there be an ultimate reality, yet it is an absolute necessity of this earthly life that we should act as if it has a meaning, that is to say, as if God exists, as if we are immortal : an absolute necessity, in other words, to make (so far as one honestly can) the supreme, reckless act of faith, to silence reason and live in the light of our spiritual longings, to follow the heart and disregard the head. Of course, reason will always want to shout in our ear that life may have no meaning whatever, that all our religious aspirations may be the morbid whinings of megalomaniacs, may be, as Leopardi wailed, so much stinking pride : but, if reason is right, let us still follow the heart, let us then (with Sénancour) so live during this life that, when death and utter annihilation finally overtake us, that will not be a just fate. Faith, this deliberate crucifixion of reason, is, thought Unamuno, something akin to madness, delirium : and what he wanted to see in Spain was more Don Quixotes of the spirit, mad Knights errant of the faith, more spiritual heroes, desperados, more people ready to cry, with Tertullian, '*credo quia impossibile*.' It is not rational necessity

> 'but vital anguish that impels us to believe in God. And to believe in God . . . is, before all and above all, to feel a hunger for God, a hunger for divinity, to be sensible of His lack and absence, to wish that God may exist.'[4]

[4] *Tragic Sense*: p. 184.

> 'To believe in God is to long for His existence and, further, it is to act as if He existed; it is to live by this longing and to make it the inner spring of our action.' [5]

One of his favourite prayers was, Lord, I believe, help thou my unbelief; that is to say, Lord, I want to believe and I partly do believe, help me to believe yet more. And he sometimes wished that he had been born not in this doubting age, but in one of the ages of faith.

> 'Many times I have wished in my secret heart that I had lived in one of those ages of burning faith, among a people consumed by an infinite passion, among the Crusaders or among the Albigenses, in the ranks of Cromwell's Ironsides or of Coligny's Huguenots, or in the obscurity of the monastery in which Heinrich Seus* underwent his tremendous mortifications.' [6]

For he felt that his soul, like the soul of Spain, was (although having experienced to the full the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Revolution) essentially medieval still.

Although he loved in a sense the popular religion of the Spanish peasants, he hated official Catholicism, and especially the Catholicism of the Jesuits: and all his life he was searching for a modernized form of Christianity, for a synthesis, if you like, between the aspirations of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The God whom he wished to worship was not that lifeless abstraction which the scholastic finds, or thinks he finds, at the end of his syllogism, but the God of the Lord's Prayer, the Father of Jesus. And he, like the English Modernists, hated the rigid dogmatism, whether of traditionalists or secularists, which he found all around him.

> 'To make the attainment of eternal happiness dependent upon believing or not believing in the Procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son and not from the Father alone, or in the Divinity of Jesus, or in the theory of the Hypostatic Union, or even in the existence of God, is, as a moment's reflection will show, nothing less than monstrous. A human God—and that is the only kind of God we are able to conceive—would never reject him who was unable to believe in him with his head,'[7]

as long as his heart yearned for him. Unamuno particularly abhorred the doctrine of everlasting punishment.

> 'The proper end of justice is pardon, and in our transit to the life to come, in the hour of death, while alone with God, the mystery of

[5] *Tragic Sense*: p. 185.
[6] *Essays*: p. 152.
* Known to us as Suso.
[7] *Tragic Sense*: p. 266.

pardon is consummated for all men. With the pain of life and the penalties attached to it, all the misdeeds of life are compensated.' [8]

Christianity, for him, is not a body of doctrine, but a life. The true Christian is he whose soul is permeated by the spirit of Christ, that is to say by the spirit of the Gospels. And the spirit of Christ which is caught by the diligent reading of the Gospels is of much more importance than the historical Jesus, whoever he may have been.

'I count every man a Christian who invokes the name of Christ with respect and love, and I am repelled by the orthodox, whether Catholic or Protestant—the latter being usually as intransigent as the former—who deny the Christianity of those who interpret the Gospel differently from themselves. I know a Protestant Christian who denies that Unitarians are Christians.' [9]

He greatly admired the Spanish conception of that tremendously human, agonizing Christ, a conception natural to people addicted to the bull ring.

'They are terribly tragic, our crucifixes, our Spanish Christs. They represent the cult of Christ agonizing, not yet dead . . . Christ on the cross, whom we worship, is the agonizing Christ, crying *Consummatum est!* It is to the Christ of the "My God, why hast thou forsaken me?" that agonizing believers turn.' [10]

At different times he (who held all his beliefs tentatively, undogmatically, and who claimed the liberty of contradicting himself) apparently held very divergent views on the relation between Christianity and Culture. When he was writing his *Agony of Christianity*, he seems (with Kierkegaard in his later years) to have favoured the view that Christianity, at least pure Christianity, was antagonistic to Culture.

'Only the hermit approaches the ideal of the individualistic life.' [11] and Christianity is absolute individualism. 'It has often been said that Protestant Christianity, particularly Calvinistic Christianity, is a creed of individualism. But individual Christianity exists only in celibacy; Christianity within the family is no longer pure Christianity but a compromise with the age. To follow Christ, a man must abandon father and mother and brothers and wife and children, and if the continuation of the human race is thereby imperilled, so much the worse for it!' [12] 'Democracy, civil liberty, dictatorship or tyranny have nothing to do with Christianity.' [13]

[8] *The Life of Don Quixote and Sancho*, according to Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, expounded with comment by Miguel de Unamuno. Trans. by Homer P. Earle. (Alfred A. Knopf. New York. 1925.) p. 89.

[9] *Essays*: p. 157.

[10] *Agony*: p. 26.

[11] *Agony*: p. 114.

[12] *Agony*: p. 115.

[13] *Agony*: p. 104.

But elsewhere he proclaims, what is more attractive to the Englishman, that Christianity should be the driving force of culture.

> 'Perhaps Luther rendered no greater service to Christian civilization than that of establishing the religious value of the civil occupation, of shattering the monastic and medieval idea of the religious calling.' [14]

What Luther attempted to do was to 'disecclesiasticize' Christianity, and it is a 'disecclesiasticized' form of Christianity, a Christianity which will be the leaven of culture, that Spain so sorely needs.

Unamuno hated with all his medieval soul the materialism which, he thought, is characteristic of modern highly industrialised countries, and he was bitterly opposed to those Spanish intellectuals who wanted, as they said, to modernize, to Europeanize Spain, to make Spain progressive. Not of course that he objected to the inventions of science permeating his country, but he did object to those who, worshipping Science and Material Progress (gods who must have capital letters), lost their own souls. He hoped that it might be the mission of Spain, of Catholic Spain, while receiving into herself these wonders of science, to keep alive in Europe a philosophy of the spirit, a faith.

Many of his ideas naturally seem strange to English people, but his outlook upon life (which he considered so thoroughly Spanish) was in many respects very much akin to our own. He liked to follow the middle way between the extremes of conservatism and (in the wide sense of the term) modernism. He realized that religion and culture are at the cross roads, and that both must (to some extent) change for the better if they are to march into the future. And (here he was especially like John Bull) he hated dogmatism, and judged all beliefs pragmatically, by how they affect practice.

[14] *Tragic Sense*: p. 270.

THE NOBLEST OF THE BARBARIANS

By Gamaliel Milner, M.A., author of *The Problem of Decadence.*

GIBBON at the conclusion of the opening chapter of his History, after describing in glowing terms the general felicity of the world during the period which he regards as the happiest ever experienced by the human race, the Age of the Antonines, rather unexpectedly ends on a note of pessimism. Happiness, it seems, is bad for man and leads by some inevitable law to stagnation and decay; intellectual degeneration sets in.

> 'The beauties of the poets and orators, instead of kindling a fire like their own, inspired only cold and servile imitation: or, if they ventured to deviate from those models, they deviated at the same time from good sense and propriety.'

(Some old fogies might apply the latter part of this sentence to the younger writers of to-day.)

> 'The diminutive stature of mankind was daily sinking below the old standard, and the Roman world was indeed peopled by a race of pigmies, when the fierce giants of the North broke in and mended the puny breed.'

It was common during the nineteenth century to contrast the noble, freedom-loving Teutons with the decadent Latins. Freeman, says Matthew Arnold, saw all things in Teutonism, as Malebranche saw all things in God, and the cult of the Nordic race bids fair to become the national religion of modern Germany.

Theodoric the Ostrogoth, it is generally conceded, represents the German invader at his best; he was a worthy forerunner of the Saxon Emperors of the tenth century who rescued the Papacy from degradation and prepared the way for the mediaeval Renaissance. But between Theodoric and the Holy Roman Empire lay the morass of the Dark Ages. The upward path of humanity is a dreadfully circuitous one; as Christian in his journey to the Celestial City wasted his time, blundered into the Slough of Despond and got locked up in Doubting Castle, so has Everyman in his journey toward higher things.

Theodoric rescued Italy from anarchy and gave it peace, prosperity and religious toleration, but before he died the sky

began to darken again, and in a dozen years his dynasty was extinct, and Italy, not to be reunited till 1870, sank into a heap of ruins in which bands of marauders, Byzantines, Lombards, Franks, fought over the little wealth that remained, like dogs gnawing a meatless bone.

The race of the Amals from which Theodoric was sprung claimed descent from the demi-gods of the Teutonic mythology. From them were chosen most of the kings of the great Gothic peoples which, originating, it is said, in Scandinavia, exercised sway at one time over regions as remote as Russia and Spain and then vanished from history. Of all the invaders they showed the greatest aptitude for civilization and were the first to embrace Christianity.

At the time of Theodoric's birth the Ostrogoths under his father's rule were camped on the plains of Hungary. His boyhood was passed as a hostage at Constantinople, where he imbibed a tincture of Roman culture and conceived a great admiration for *Romanitas* — civilization. The order, the stately fabric of Roman Law, the magnificent buildings of Constantinople, the material comforts which he saw about him, profoundly impressed the princeling from the skin-clad North. To obtain a lodgement for himself and his people in this ordered world became the object of his ambition. But his stay was not a long one; when he was seventeen years old his father's death recalled him to the camps of Pannonia and the endless vicissitudes of tribal warfare. Not till he was thirty-four did his opportunity come. Zeno, the Emperor, wished to free the Balkan Peninsula from the Goths. He therefore suggested to Theodoric that he should settle in Italy with his tribesmen and recover for the Empire a province lost by the usurpation of Odoacer, a leader of Teutonic mercenaries who had exercised control since the disappearance of the last of the Western Emperors. Theodoric and his people, a quarter of a million, it is said, trekked into Italy with their women and children in wagons. After a severe struggle lasting five years he triumphed, not without some circumstances of cruelty and perfidy; after a hollow peace he stabbed Odoacer with his own hand at a banquet. So far there seemed little to distinguish him from many another barbarian free-lance of the day.

The sequel showed that Theodoric was no ordinary adventurer. The victory over Odoacer won, he sheathed his sword and waged no further wars but in self-defence. He devoted himself with untiring industry to the civil administration of Italy. His Gothic warriors were settled on the land which he had taken from Odoacer and his followers. Their status resembled that of the Manchus in China before the revolution of 1911; they were a military class entrusted with the defence of the country and the maintenance of order but excluded from the civil service. Justice was strictly enforced according to the law of ancient Rome; venality was checked; agriculture flourished once again, all the more because the Roman populace were no longer fed with foreign corn; ancient edifices falling into decay were restored, and the scandalous practice of using the remains of antiquity for the erection of new and mean buildings was checked. It was the brief Indian Summer of Roman civilization.

For much of the success of his reign and for the greater part of his subsequent fame Theodoric was indebted to his minister, Cassiodorus, statesman, historian, monk, whose voluminous correspondence has preserved a vivid picture of the Italy of the sixth century. Cassiodorus belonged to a family of landowners whose hereditary estates were in Calabria, hard by the ancient Scylaceum. Gissing, who in his almost forgotten novel *Veranilda* tried to reawaken the memories of this far-off age, went on a pilgrimage to the squalid modern town on purpose to see the site of the villa, later turned into a monastery, of Cassiodorus. The minister of Theodoric inherited the traditions of the Roman bureaucracy and was pleased to place his experience and culture at the service of the barbarian who admired and sought to preserve the old Roman past. As Master of the Offices he translated the thoughts of Theodoric into the highly rhetorical and somewhat affected Latin of the day, embroidering official documents with many curious and chatty disquisitions. Anxious to promote the fusion of the Gothic and Roman races, he wrote a history of the Goths which traced them back to the siege of Troy. He seems to have been not only the minister but the companion and friend of his master, whom he served the more faithfully because he felt that in doing so he was serving the cause of civilization.

Naaman was a mighty man of valour and the deliverer of Syria, but he was a leper. A similar taint clung to Theodoric, a spiritual taint: he was an Arian. Had he but been converted to the Faith of Nicaea, as was his contemporary, the savage Clovis (who seems, by the way, to have been quite as great a rogue after baptism as before it), the history of the world might have been different. In the sixth century the Catholic Church had already become, at least in the West, the residuary legatee of ancient civilization. The old Roman families, like the Symmachi, who a hundred years before had clung to Paganism and looked down on the new-fangled religion, had finally capitulated; they were entering monasteries or, if they preferred an active life, becoming bishops. Unhappily for themselves, the Goths had been converted at a time when the Empire was Arian. Had they only remained heathen for two centuries longer, like the Franks, they might have entered the Catholic fold. It is improbable that these rough warriors had any conception of the metaphysical questions at stake; the infinite chasm which separates *homoousion* from *homoiousion* probably evaded their notice. But if they had no reasoned theological opinions, they had their feelings, their prejudices. Mr. Shane Leslie tells us that in his Anglican days Manning had a Roman Catholic gardener whom he persuaded to abjure the errors of the Church of Rome; when the future Cardinal entered the Roman fold, he tried to persuade the gardener to accompany him. The man declined; he had changed his religion once to please his reverence, and that was enough. Similarly the Goths felt that in abandoning Woden and Thor for Christ they had done enough to please their more civilized neighbours; self-respect forbade further tergiversation. Besides, they revered the memory of their apostle, Ulfilas, who was an Arian; they preferred the ministrations of their native priests to those of the conquered provincials. Usually (Genseric was an exception) they made no attempt to impose their confession on the subject peoples. Theodoric particularly went out of his way to show respect for the Catholic hierarchy and for the Pope. He was angry when a Roman deacon, to please him, turned Arian; an exaggerated story says he even condemned the man to death. A thousand years before Locke's essay on toleration he enunciated the principle that Cassiodorus expressed in

Latin :

> '*Religionem imperare non possumus, quia nemo cogitur ut credat invitus*—we cannot impose a religious faith, for no one can be compelled to believe against his conscience.'

For the first half of Theodoric's reign the system of toleration seemed to work pretty well; but the Catholic Church, as Mr. Belloc has explained with his usual lucidity, cannot accept toleration as a final solution :

> 'Catholic life is not normal to a society unless Catholic morals and doctrine be supreme therein. Unless the morals of the Faith appear fully in the laws of that society, the Church is ill at ease.' [1]

But for twenty years the dislike of the Roman hierarchy for their Arian overlord was checked by the growing alienation between Rome on the one hand and the Eastern Emperor and the Patriarch of Constantinople on the other. In the East the struggle with Monophysitism was at its height. It is difficult for a generation which for the most part yawns over theological discussion to understand the passionate enthusiasm with which recondite theories about the Incarnation inspired all ranks and classes of men in the Eastern Empire. Gibbon thus describes the behaviour of the orthodox mob in Constantinople in a riot which broke out under an Emperor suspected of Monophysitism :

> 'Day and night they were incessantly busied either in singing hymns to the honour of their God, or in pillaging or murdering the servants of their prince. The head of his favourite monk, the friend, as they styled him, of the enemy of the Holy Trinity, was borne aloft on a spear; and the firebrands, which had been darted against heretical structures, diffused the undistinguishing flames over the most orthodox buildings.'

This happened during the reign of Anastasius, a kindly and conscientious old man. His predecessor Zeno, a rather shifty character, got the Patriarch of Constantinople to draw up an eirenicon, intended as far as possible to satisfy all parties. It was rather like the doctrinal statements drawn up by Anglican Commissions, intended to satisfy Anglo-Catholics on the one hand and Evangelicals and Modernists on the other. This well-meant olive branch, however, was a red rag to the Popes, always resentful of any lead by the heads of the upstart see of Constantinople. Secure beneath the aegis of his Arian protector, the Pontiff darted excommunications at the Patriarch and the Em-

[1] *Survivals and New Arrivals*, page 163.

peror. Theodoric and Cassiodorus looked on well pleased.

But as Theodoric grew older things changed for the worse. Clovis was baptized by a Catholic prelate, the first Catholic king in the Western world, the eldest son of the Church. Religion served as a pretext for aggression. 'It grieves me,' said the pious neophyte, 'that these Goths, Arians as they are, should possess the fairest parts of Gaul.' So under the august patronage of St. Martin of Tours, and supported by the Gallo-Roman Catholic party, he went to war with Alaric, the kinsman of Theodoric, and slew him in battle. Theodoric, pacific as he was, had to go to war to preserve Spain and a strip of Gaul for Alaric's son. Peace was restored, but the Gothic ruler of Italy must have felt unpleasant doubts about the loyalty of his own Catholic subjects. Next, an orthodox Emperor ascended the Eastern throne; the *Henoticon* was consigned to the dustbin; harmony reigned between the Papacy and Constantinople. The Arian churches in the East were closed; the profession of Arianism had long been illegal, but by this time the Arian was normally a barbarian auxiliary soldier, a poor controversialist but an awkward customer to tackle with the arm of flesh. But the new Emperor Justin, himself a rough frontiersman, plucked up his courage and shut up the Arian church in his capital. Theodoric was annoyed; here were the Catholics enjoying the most perfect toleration in his dominions; surely he might expect a little reciprocity. By his command the Pope went to Constantinople to inform the Emperor that unless the Arians were tolerated in the East it might be the worse for the Catholics in Italy. The Pope had a magnificent reception, but came back empty-handed as far as Theodoric's demand for toleration was concerned. Theodoric accused him of double dealing and cast him into prison, where he died.

Suspicions, which were probably not groundless, seized upon the mind of the barbarian that the Senators were plotting for a restoration of Roman and Catholic rule. He was an old man now, over seventy, anxious for the future of his race and family; he had no son, only a widowed daughter with a boy of ten. In his anger and alarm he struck out wildly, imprisoned and afterwards put to death Symmachus, the chief of the Senate, and the philosopher Boethius. He died under a cloud; all his virtues

could not atone for his heresy and the severities of the last few months of his reign.

Stranger stories gathered round his last hours. There is a grotesque anecdote related by Procopius that one day at dinner a great fish's head was set before him which glared at him, gnashed its teeth, and changed into the form of the murdered Symmachus. The story suggests that the defunct Senator must have been of rather unattractive appearance. Still more macabre is the tale told by Gregory the Great about an official who landed at the island of Lipari apparently to collect the taxes. On the beach he met a hermit who exclaimed, 'Theodoric is dead.' 'He was in good health when I left him,' said the tax-collector. 'I have just seen him pass with hands fettered, dragged along by Pope John and Symmachus, to be thrown down the crater of the volcano,' replied the holy man. Whatever may have happened to Theodoric's soul, his body underwent some strange vicissitudes. Some years after his death, during the age of confusion, it disappeared from the mausoleum at Ravenna, stolen probably for the sake of its rich ornaments. In 1854 some labourers who were digging near the tomb found a skeleton in a golden cuirass, which may have been that of the Gothic King of Italy.

Theodoric's work died with him; his daughter Amalasuntha had inherited his ideas, but she was hampered by her sex and by the alienation of Goth and Roman whom her father for a brief space had held together. Her end was to be murdered by an ambitious kinsman. In a generation the Ostrogoths vanished without leaving a trace behind them. Cassiodorus, when their cause had become plainly hopeless, made his peace with the Empire, became a monk, and turned his mansion into a monastery. He lived till he was ninety in studious retirement. He has an honourable place in the history of European culture; his monastery at Vivariense was the first to begin the systematic preservation and multiplication of ancient manuscripts, secular as well as sacred, without which many treasures of ancient literature would have been lost for ever. Gissing says of him:

> 'In abandoning the world, he by no means renounced his interest in its civilization. Statesmanship having failed to stem the tide of Oriental tyranny and Northern barbarism, he set himself to save as much as possible of the nobler part, to secure for happier ages the record of human attainment.'

CAN WE REACH A FINAL THEORY OF THE ATONEMENT?

By the Rev. T. Hywel Hughes, M.A., D.D., D.Litt., Emeritus Principal, Scottish Congregational College.

WE must believe that a final theory is possible and that sooner or later it will be found. But that will only be when the whole process of reconciliation is complete, and then we shall not need it. In this world of conflict and broken truths we cannot hope for anything final; it is quite certain that we have not yet found it. The history of Christian thought with the many theories advocated is sufficient proof of this. The long train of doctrinal differences on the question stands in effective protest against anything approaching finality. Moreover the various attempts made in modern days to re-state the doctrine, either by toning down the rigidies of the older theories, or by introducing new ideas, adds weight to the protest. It would seem also as if the corporate thought of the Church has realized this, for the atonement is the only great Christian doctrine on which the Church has not set her *imprimatur* or made her declaration of faith, thus signifying that she has not reached final conclusions on the question. There is no orthodox doctrine of the atonement. This suggests that the Christian consciousness felt that no final and authoritative truth had been revealed regarding the Death of Christ. Many modern thinkers have reached the same conclusion. Dr. Forsyth, for instance, puts the position thus:

> 'The Cross has to do with the Holiness of God and with the depth of human sin, and these are too big for logic.' [1]

Dr. H. R. Mackintosh agrees, for he says:

> 'God has not dictated to us, even in the New Testament, any final theory of His reconciling work.' [2]

Canon Mozley admits that

> 'we cannot find a final theory, as is proved by the fact that the search for one is still going on and new theories are propounded.' [3]

[1] *Cruciality of the Cross*, p. 37.
[2] *The Christian Experience of Forgiveness*, p. 194.
[3] *The Heart of the Gospel*, p. 53.

The question might be raised whether we need a theory. Life is deeper than thought; experience always goes beyond any interpretation of it. It is clear from our knowledge of Christian experience through the ages that many souls have shared in the redemptive action of God in Christ, partaking of the joy of salvation, who have had most inadequate theories. The experience may be, often is, real in spite of most irrational and fragmentary conceptions of its *modus operandi*. Men have become freemen of Christ with little or no theory. A theory may come later in the effort to understand what is implied in the experience or to interpret it to others. It is not needed in order to partake in the experience. All that is needed for this is faith or the love-surrender to Christ. If however the experience is to become established in the soul and to continue to energize in life, some theory must be evolved. This is a necessity of man's intellectual nature. The experience has to be grasped by the mind and must receive a measure of understanding by the reason; in a word, it must find a place in some system of truth. When it is thus wrought into the structure of thought and woven into a system, it becomes stronger and more lasting. On the other hand, we must note that if there is no final *theory* of the atonement, this does not mean that there is no finality in the act of God in Jesus Christ on the Cross. There is something eternal and final in the Cross. It represents God's final and utmost effort in self-giving love to redeem the world, to rectify the moral twist or fracture made by sin in the moral and spiritual universe. In this respect 'it is finished.' No more is necessary to redeem man, and, reverently we say it, no more is possible to God, for He went to the limit of self-sacrifice in the Cross of His Son. 'There is no other name given under heaven whereby men can be saved.'

Dr. Sidney Cave in a recent book points out that there are three factors in the presentation and acceptance of theological truth. First, we have 'Revelation,' that which is revealed by God. Then, 'Appropriation' by man when he receives, or experiences, what is revealed. Finally, 'Interpretation,' when man seeks to explain it to himself or to others. Now it is clear that man's appropriation of the 'Revealed' is always partial, dependent on many conditions. For this reason all attempts at Interpretation—and this is the stage in which a theory becomes rele-

vant—must be inadequate. The first factor, however—Revelation—has finality. To say then that no theory is final does not detract from the value of the finality of the atoning fact. This was done once for all. What are the reasons why no theory can be final? One has already been suggested, but there are others.

(A) We must emphasize the fact that we cannot reach finality in any realm of truth. Facts are concrete definite realities; truth is ever growing; theories are at best fluid and unstable. Truth is ever a quest, never a conquest. It always presses on to a horizon that grows bigger as we approach it. This does not mean that we cannot reach a truth which satisfies, on which we can rest. But it does mean that we cannot say that we have reached final truth, seen the last fragment of possible truth, in any realm. In reality all philosophy is an attitude of mind rather than a body of truth. It is our experience of the world becoming reflective and endeavouring to comprehend itself. For this reason a final philosophical theory is not to be attained, a fixed and complete system is not to be expected. All that we can do in philosophy is to catch the trend of the process and to try and discover its main principles and general laws. If this be true in philosophy, it is more profoundly true in theology, which is only our religious experience becoming reflective and seeking to interpret itself. In his religious experience man touches the deepest as well as the highest points of his being. In the religious consciousness human personality is functioning at its highest, so that he is most fully himself when he is most completely God's. This is what led Edward Caird to say that

> 'Man in his religious consciousness comes nearer to ultimate reality than in any other experience.'

This is also why man finds in religion a satisfaction and a peace that nothing else can give. An examination of the religious consciousness at its deepest suggests that the central element is the sense of deliverance, the consciousness that God is working out in us His redemptive purpose, and seeking through us to work it out in the world. This experience is deeper than any possible in the realm of thought, and for that reason it is more difficult to reach a final theory than in the field of philosophy.

(B) Again, atonement is an experience that becomes real in each soul that trusts itself to God in Christ. It is different for

every soul. In a sense, then, there may be as many theories as there are persons experiencing. Certain basic and generic factors are present in each experience, but in itself it is different for each soul. Moreover, the redemptive process may continue and grow. The process is the expression of the eternal purpose and energy of God. He is ever giving Himself forth to redeem men. The process breaks forth into articulation, expressing itself most fully in the life and death of Jesus Christ. But it has ever been going on, and will go on, until the divine purpose is realised. It is a continuing process in each soul also. It is what God does to save a man. Man knows more of it in the daily cleansing, the daily victory and peace. We cannot exhaust the redemptive forces nor explore the atoning purpose of God in one experience, however profound. It is thus a growing experience, and a final theory is impossible until the process is complete.

(c) Again, knowledge is ever growing. Our concepts, the current coin of our thinking process, are constantly growing. This fact tells on the theory of the atonement in two ways.

(*a*) The experience itself runs into, and is expressed in, the forms and categories of the time. As we have said, the experience in all cases has certain great features that remain the same in principle and power, but it runs into different moulds. This is why the old forms fail to satisfy men to-day, not because they do not enshrine some truth, for each one does this. They fail to satisfy because they are the experiences of men run into moulds that are antiquated, and expressed in forms of thought that have been transcended.

(*b*) Again, every theory has to be examined by, and must face up to, the assured knowledge of the day. As that knowledge grows wider and richer, so our theory of atonement should grow. Truth is all of a piece. There are no contradictions to God and His experience. The contradictions are of our making. Any new discovery reacts on all truth; adjustments have to be made. This is clear in what followed the discovery of the theory of Relativity. Now, in the last issue, every new discovery reacts on theology. With growing truth there must be growing apprehension and a developing view of the atonement. Any theory we may reach will have to face new challenges and seek fresh adjustments. For that reason it can never become a final or com-

plete view. In a sense the truth of atonement is the profoundest of all truths because it is an expression of the deepest reality in God's being. We can see deep enough into the mystery to be able to envisage what lines a final theory must take.

I.

It must rest four-square on the Fatherhood and Love of God as revealed in Jesus Christ. No theory can long survive that does an injustice to, or is out of harmony with, this basic truth of Jesus. This has already been realized by many modern thinkers, such as Halliday, Dick Fleming, Cave and Stevens, and, from some points of view, Hastings Rashdall, for they seek to make the conception of Fatherhood basal. Moreover, Forsyth, Mackintosh and Mozley emphasize Love, although they insist that it is 'Holy Love,' in some cases stressing holiness until it becomes primary, in others holding that holiness and love are one in God.

Now to make Love the basic element at once rules out such ideas as (*a*) that of many post-Reformation thinkers of a conflict or cleavage between the holiness and the love of God; (*b*) the insistence on punitive justice to such an extent as to make the whole matter a legal transaction; (*c*) such conceptions as satisfaction to the honour of God, (*d*) to the authority of law; (*e*) the ransom theory; (*f*) as well as the penal satisfaction theory in its cruder forms. It will also rule out, in the final issue, all thought of punishment as vindictive or purely retributive, making it educative, remedial, or preventative. Moreover, this firm grasp on love as the basis will exclude the excessive emphasis on *Sin* in the abstract, and throw the emphasis on the *sinner*, so that whatever is done will have as its motive and supreme purpose the good of the sinner and his ultimate reunion with God. Finally, this basal position of love will establish 'reconciliation' as the most satisfying conception rather than redemption or justification. The concept of sin will be understood as moving in the realm of love. It will be regarded, not as the breach of a law merely, nor yet as an outrage to God's honour, nor even as a failure to live up to an ideal; it is an outrage on love, disloyalty to the filial relationship. Its cure will therefore be envisaged as

a re-established harmony, the restored fellowship of a son with his Father. All this will be solid gain.

II.

Again, it is fairly certain that the distinction between subjective and objective theories will disappear, transcended by a view that includes the truth enshrined in each of these. Forgiveness always has two aspects, or perhaps we should express it better by saying that it moves between two poles and involves two persons. As applied to the atonement this means that God on His side must be willing and ready to forgive, whilst, on man's side, there must be a state of forgiveableness, the condition of mind and spirit in which he is able and willing to receive what God gives. It can never be unconditional, never 'free' in the sense that it is without conditions, and one of the chief conditions—if not indeed the supreme condition—is that man is *able* to receive it, that he has been brought to a state of spiritual receptivity or forgiveableness and has the willingness to accept God's gift in Christ.

Now we may state it as one of the postulates that whatever is done in Christ's Life and Death—for the whole must be taken into account—is done to make men forgiveable, to bring them to that state of spirit and heart in which they are capable of receiving and appropriating the free gift of forgiveness from God. This is the truth behind the Subjective Theories, especially in the form known as The Moral Influence Theory. This must have a place in any theory that is to prove permanently satisfactory. We may go further and say that, as far as we human beings are concerned, the subjective aspect is the more important one. God has done what He can; it is for us now to appropriate and claim His gift. We claim it, and it really becomes ours, the moment we are in a fit state to receive it. We may growingly appropriate it, finding more and more in it, but it becomes ours and is effective in us as soon as we are capable of receiving it.

But there are other considerations which seem to me to render the subjective theory inadequate as it is usually stated. It demands something in the nature of an objective theory to be

complete. The total situation is such that it cannot be met, nor its demands satisfied, by a purely subjective view, and that for the reason that there are the two poles already mentioned in the total situation, involving the personality of God as well as that of man. These two have to be considered and their claims, with the moral realities involved, must be safeguarded and met. Forgiveness in God and forgiveableness in man have to become one in an act of saving grace. We have already suggested that forgiveness can never be unconditional. To forgive unconditionally is to rob forgiveness of its deepest spiritual meaning. We may forgive (God never does) in such a way as to make forgiveness cheap, and to do so is to do an injury to the personality of the one forgiven, and also an injury to our own personality. Such forgiveness is damaging to both parties in the situation. In reality only God can forgive. There are so many ramifications of the effect of sin that, in the final issue, only the all-powerful, the all-seeing and the all-loving God can forgive. Real forgiveness demands so much and goes so deep that only God is adequate to it. If forgiveness is to have meaning and to become a dynamic for good, it must follow the great moral and spiritual laws, and have respect for moral and spiritual values. Its prime condition is that it should be done in such a way as to respect and safeguard personality in both parties. God will forgive in a way that safeguards the highest and best in the sinner's personality. On the other hand, He has to respect and safeguard His own personality. He will not forgive in a way that does injury to, or is against, His own nature. There must be something in Him that makes forgiveness possible without injury to the moral realities of His being. We thus begin to see that, although the subjective aspect is the more important so far as we are concerned, there is an objective reality on God's side that must be taken as a real factor in the situation as a whole. This is the objective element in the situation, something that impels Him and makes it possible for Him to act in such a way in forgiving as to maintain the basis of moral and spiritual reality, to be true to His own being. This necessitates something objective in the whole movement. So the two, subjective and objective, must have a place in any satisfactory theory.

III.

One other point must be emphasized. Whatever is done in the work of atonement is done supremely in the realm of spiritual realities. Forgiveness is the greatest and most wonderful spiritual fact in all the universe. It is the supreme miracle of divine grace, and all the out-going of the divine nature in love and mercy is needed to make it possible. This operation lies wholly in the realm of spiritual realities, since God is spirit. It would not be necessary to insist on this were it not for the fact that almost all the emphasis is laid by some thinkers on some one or other of the physical factors in the death of Christ, such as His sufferings, His blood, etc. Now the working out of spiritual purposes and the realization of spiritual ends may involve, of necessity, certain physical facts and experiences, but we must never forget that those are not primary. They are secondary, dependent on the spiritual realities of which they are the expression. To put it concretely, it is not the suffering or the death of Jesus as such that saves. Rather is it something spiritual behind these of which they are the expression, the out-going love and mercy of God. In the final issue, contact or union with the living Christ who died is what saves. But we may now go further and say that whatever physical facts and experiences were necessary for the carrying out of spiritual purposes will be such as to bring about the end of making men able to receive the self-giving of God. In other words, we must believe that although the suffering and death of Jesus are secondary to the spiritual reality — *i.e.* the purpose of God through the ages — they are yet the best fitted and most capable of producing the spiritual condition in man that makes him able to respond to the out-going love of God in the life and death of Jesus so that he may receive and appropriate forgiveness to himself.

Here we come in sight of two important facts bearing on the situation. First we note that the most powerful and effective dynamic for good in the world is suffering love, suffering vicariously borne out of love for others. This is one reason why the sufferings of the Cross are central to our problem on the

human side. It is a revelation of love suffering for others, an utterance of the suffering of God. But whilst we say this, we must also say in the second place, that suffering, as such, cannot save. It may harden or deaden the soul. The mere suffering of Jesus, then, cannot be the supreme element in the Cross.

Suffering voluntarily embraced and borne for others, love going out and taking the initiative, implicating itself in man's sin and its consequences and bearing it all; this is what makes the appeal and the dynamic of the Cross. Now the phrase 'implicating itself in man's sin' gives the clue to what may be the deepest reality in the whole situation. We shall never be able to grasp the full meaning of the atonement, and every age has to discover its meaning anew. We can, however, catch gleams of fresh insight and discover rays of new light that enable us to see a little into the mystery. The word 'implicating' is one of these, for there is a sense in which God was implicated in man's sin. He did not make men to sin, nor did He actually cause men to sin. Sin is man's doing and he is responsible for it, since it springs from his will. But whilst we cannot, and must not, make God responsible for sin, can we not say that, in a sense, He is implicated in it? He gave man his free-will, a great and dangerous gift carrying with it fateful possibilities. God has that much responsibility in the matter, sufficient for us to say, taking the situation in its entirety, that He is to some extent implicated in it. One hesitates to push this too far, and human analogies are not always safe, but we can dimly understand how God, having given man the fateful gift of freedom, might feel some kind of responsibility for what issued from it. If that be so, we can vaguely understand why He should initiate the movement to save men from sin, and perceive also why the heart of this movement should be found in suffering and sacrifice. Still more we can understand a little also how the movement to redeem should afford some satisfaction to God, and, if we may say it reverently, bring peace and joy to the divine heart. The Cross is the utterance of the whole of the divine nature, not in its magnitude or its quantitative aspect, but in its qualitative and spiritual aspect. It was not only an utterance of God's love—though it was primarily this—but

also of His being in its entirety, holiness, justice, power, whatever these moral realities mean to Him. In this self-giving must there not have been some sense of satisfaction, something like what we experience when we seek to rectify a wrong? We are moving in the realm of mysteries and we cannot dogmatize, but we may suggest that, in addition to the love motive, there was an utterance of the moral being of God in its sense of implication in the fact of human sin. If there is any truth in this suggestion, then we can see still more clearly that there is an objective side to the atonement, and that the purely subjective view needs this to make it real. Man's sin made havoc of the moral realities, wrought a twist, a distortion, an abnormality, a surd—call it what we may—in the universe of moral beings, breaking the equilibrium and establishing disharmony at the heart of things. The self-sacrifice and obedience of Christ are so tremendous, so charged with moral potencies as the utterance of the outgoing love and moral being of God, that they work a profound change in the moral universe of which God and man are members. The Cross rectifies the twist, restores equilibrium and harmony, bringing a right adjustment. So the world is a forgiven world, reconciled to God. This is what makes the Cross, as Dr. James Denney said, 'the greatest moment in the moral history of God.' We may add that it was the greatest moment also in the moral history of the universe. Now modern psychology gives us a little help at this point. It has made it clear (Adler is the one who stresses this most) that there is inherent in the mind of man and in his whole being, a tendency to recover equilibrium when disturbed, to achieve harmonious functioning when disharmony is present. This is one of the basic principles of Psycho-analysis in its treatment of psychic maladies. We are getting to realise that this principle is wider in its application than the realm of psychology. It holds right through the world of nature and life. There are forces making for the restoration of health. Professor J. Arthur Thomson has shown that there are also forces working for the elimination of ugliness and the establishment of beauty. In other aspects of life the same principle may be observed. If now we bring this principle to bear on the Cross, we may reverently say that it is the supreme effort

of the moral and spiritual universe to recover equilibrium and restore the harmony disturbed by sin. Something is done by Christ in the realm of spiritual realities, by the consecration of His will to God and God's purpose, that strikes a balance and restores harmony and adjustment. In the Cross the moral and spiritual world of the Eternal God is travailing and seeking with infinite cost to find its equilibrium. Something is done that rectifies the twist, that removes the disturbing element from the universe. Shall we not say that it is the supreme effort of God to throw out, or make it possible to throw out, the alien presence and power of sin, to clarify the atmosphere in the relation between Him and man, something that bridges the gulf of estrangement, working reconciliation? So God is in Christ 'reconciling the world unto Himself,' eliminating sin and casting out its dread legacy by the sacrifice and suffering of His own heart. We by faith have now but to accept it, and in Him we are made whole. Harmony is restored in us and we are at one with Him.

BOOK REVIEWS

AN ATTEMPTED SYNTHESIS OF REALISM AND IDEALISM*

America, traditionally the land of pragmatism, nowadays seems to take metaphysics seriously, whereas the acids of logical positivism or logistic analysis are corroding the metaphysical interest of all but the most old-fashioned, or most independent (this may now be the same thing) of the younger philosophers in this country. At any rate a number of able books on metaphysical problems are appearing across the Atlantic. Mr. Campbell Garnett's book (it is one for the student of philosophy) is a clearly-written presentation of a theory of reality and value which owes much to thinkers such as Whitehead, Stout, Kemp Smith, and (perhaps above all) Alexander, but, in the early part particularly, develops an individual point of view. To my mind the most interesting feature of it is the way in which the author combines a thorough-going realism with an absorbtion of certain principal elements of the idealist logic and epistemology. (This is probably because I have suspected for some time that this is the

* *Reality and Value.* An Introduction to Metaphysics and an Essay on the Theory of Value. By A. Campbell Garnett (Associate Professor of Philosophy in the University of Wisconsin). (George Allen and Unwin. Pp. 320. 12/6 net. 1937.)

direction in which we ought to be going.) Thus he is able to maintain the objectivity of nature with a view of mind as active interpreter (incidentally he has a penetrating attack on behaviourism), and the objectivity of value without claiming that value can exist out of relation to any form of experience. I agree with his suggestion that our immediate experience of motion is the primary source of the categories of the understanding and provides the link between our knowledge of mind and the structure of matter. But I suspect that in making this primarily an experience of *time* (as distinct from the processes of which time is a standard of measurement), he puts too much weight on Alexander's famous saying that 'Time is the Mind of Space.'

Another hesitation: Was the distinction between the act of being aware and the object of awareness really a new revelation given to the world in G. E. Moore's *Mind* article in 1903? The distinction may have been obscured by the idealist tradition in the 19th century, but surely it would have been generally drawn by the mediaevals, as well as almost universally by common sense. (And what about Descartes' distinction of the *esse formale* and *esse objectivium* of an idea?) When Mr. Garnett comes on to discuss the problems of 'sense' and of values, he is well aware that it is not easy to distinguish where mental act ends and object apprehended begins. That he sees these difficulties so clearly and yet maintains a realistic account of nature and values which goes far to meet them is perhaps the main interest of his book. DOROTHY M. EMMET.

A BENEDICTINE ABBOT ON THE GOSPELS*

A work by so erudite and distinguished a writer as the late Dom Chapman demands the respectful consideration of scholars, especially since its main thesis, if correct, will show that many of the conclusions arrived at by students of the Synoptic problem during the last half-century are wrong. Before stating Dom Chapman's theory, and giving my reasons for rejecting it as not sufficiently probable, I would point out that a Roman Catholic writer is trammeled in a way in which a Protestant is not. He must accept the Catholic doctrine of the inerrancy of Holy Scripture, and 'the substantial identity of the Greek Matthew with the Aramaic original' (page xvii of Mon. Signor Barton's introduction); he is also bound to regard Matthew's Gospel as the work of an Apostle and eye witness. These preconceptions can hardly fail to have some influence upon the judgments he forms.

For instance, it is impossible for him to regard the feeding of the 5,000 and of the 4,000 as a doublet, for, if they be, the words attributed to Christ (Matthew xvi, 9, 10; *cf.* Mark viii, 19, 20) cannot be authentic. 'Do ye not yet understand neither remember the five loaves of the five thousand

* *Matthew, Mark and Luke.* By Dom John Chapman, O.S.B. (Longmans. 1937. 25/-.)

. . . neither the seven loaves of the four thousand.' Clearly, if the two narratives are different accounts of the same event Christ cannot have used the words quoted above, and then what becomes of the inerrancy of Holy Scripture? Again, if you accept as a postulate that Matthew was written by an apostle and eye witness it must be exceedingly difficult to come to the conclusion that Matthew is dependent upon Mark, however strongly the evidence may point in that direction.

The principal theses which Dom Chapman sets out to prove are:—

1. That Mark is dependent upon Matthew, and not Matthew upon Mark.
2. That Mark contains only the witness of Peter.
3. That Q (meaning thereby a single Greek document used by both Matthew and Luke) never existed.
4. That Peter is the real author of Mark, the Gospel being practically a verbatim report of Peter's lectures.
5. That Luke is to some extent dependent on Matthew.
6. That the Greek Matthew is a translation of an Aramaic original.

I will now proceed to consider each of these theses in turn.

For many years Dom Chapman accepted the two-document hypothesis, but in 1915, disquieted apparently by the findings of the Pontifical Commission of 1912 on the Synoptic problem, he writes:

> ' therefore I must assume that tradition really meant that St. Matthew's Gospel was written as a whole before St. Mark and that St. Mark's Gospel is actually an extract from it, and must see whether this can be quite easily disproved.'

These words seem to imply that, although he attached a greater importance to tradition than many of us would be inclined to do, he started on his inquiry in perfect good faith, rather hoping that what appeared to him the most probable interpretation of tradition might turn out on careful examination not to be the correct one.

' I hit upon an easy test,' he writes, ' and one that would be perfectly conclusive. This test is that wherever Mark makes a long omission we shall find some sign of the gap. He applies this test by comparing Mark iv, 1-34, with Matthew xiii, 1-51. He notes that Matthew here has seven parables and two explanations, Mark has only three parables (one peculiar to himself), one explanation, and interpolates several proverbial sayings which are found elsewhere in Matthew. He then calls attention to two places which he thinks indicate that Mark is omitting matter which he found in Matthew.

(*a*) Mark iv, 2—Matthew xiii, 3: ' He was teaching them many things in parables and he was saying in his teaching.' His comment is ' Here Mt. has *polla* and proceeds to give actually many parables. Mk. retains *polla* and intends to give only three parables, so he adds " and in the course of his instruction he said." Mk. has before him a series of many *polla*, and he has not given the whole—or so it seems.'

Here I would make two comments:—

(1) His comparison of the relative length of the two discourses is somewhat deceptive; for the amount of matter *addressed to the multitude* is about the same in both Gospels. Matthew gives four parables and one explanation, Mark three parables, a group of parabolic sayings and one explanation, so the use of the word *polla* is equally appropriate in both Gospels.

(2) Mark says 'he was teaching them many things in parables,' and not 'he taught them in many parables,' but Dom Chapman's argument seems to demand that he should have used the latter rather than the former expression. To teach many things in parables does not mean the same as to teach in many parables.

(*b*) Mark iv, 33: 'And with *many such* parables he was speaking to them . . .'

Matthew xiii, 34: '*All these things* Jesus spoke in parables to the crowd . . .' 'Here,' he says, 'Matthew sums up *panta tauta,* but Mark of necessity changes this into *toiauta polla*.' He adds that because Matthew is about to add the explanation of the parable of the tares which Mark had omitted, the latter supplies its place by the general statement that in private Christ explained all the parables to the disciples. But Mark's words as they stand are appropriate enough. I have dealt with this argument at some length, because it was the first test which Dom Chapman applied to the theory that Mark was copying Matthew. He says of it *'I had proposed a test and I was already answered.'* But is it really as conclusive as Dom Chapman believed it to be? Several criticisms occur to me.

(1) In Matthew xiii there is an inconsistency which suggests that the chapter is a compilation. In verse 10 the disciples ask 'Why do you speak to them in parables?' to which Jesus replies, 'To you it is given to know the mystery of the Kingdom of Heaven, but to them it is not given.' This seems to me to imply that Jesus did not employ parables when teaching the disciples, yet it is to the disciples that the parables which follow the explanation of the parable of the tares are apparently addressed.

(2) If Matthew is copying Mark, and not *vice versa,* it is easy to understand (as I shall show later) why the disciples' question about teaching in parables and the explanation of the parable of the sower are sandwiched between two parables addressed to the multitude; but if Matthew is the original it is difficult to understand why he did not place the explanation of the parable of the sower after the conclusion of the parables addressed to the multitude as he does that of the parable of the tares.

(3) If Mark was copying Matthew and shortening his narrative, it is not easy to see why he should have inserted the parable of the seed growing secretly and the detached sayings (verses 21—25) where he does. It is true that parallels to these sayings are found in Matthew elsewhere—but not together, nor as far as several of them are concerned in the same words.

It is therefore more probable that Mark derived them from some other source. The first two differ widely in wording from their parallels in Matthew:—

(i) Mark iv, 21: 'Is the lamp brought to be put under the bushel or under the bed and not to be put on the stand.'

Matthew v, 15: 'Neither do men light a lamp and put it under the bushel, but on the stand.'

(ii) Mark iv, 22: 'For there is nothing hid save that it should be manifested, neither was anything made secret but that it should come to light.'

Matthew x, 26: 'For there is nothing covered which shall not be revealed and hid that shall not be known.'

Even the English of the Revised Version makes it obvious that Mark cannot have been copying the written words of Matthew when he wrote these two verses. If Mark derived these sayings from Matthew at all he must have been quoting from memory. Is it *prima facie* at all probable that Mark, if he were condensing Matthew, would have inserted five detached sayings which he rather inaccurately recalled and most of which occur in other contexts in Matthew?

It is true that Mark iv, 1—34, shows clear indications that it is composite. The insertion of the explanation of the parable of the sower in the midst of the discourse addressed to the multitude is an inconsistency in Mark, as it is in Matthew, but may just as well have been taken over by Matthew from Mark as *vice versa*. The use *seven* times in this passage of the words *kai elegen* (and he was saying) strongly suggest that Mark was drawing upon a collection of sayings of Jesus; if so, the whole discourse from 2—32, except the explanation of the parable of the sower, may well have been drawn from this source, and it is noteworthy that the explanation of the parable of the sower is not introduced by the significant *kai elegen*. It is not hard to see why Mark should have placed this explanation where he does, though it spoils the symmetry of the discourse: it is to bring the explanation of the parable into close relation with the parable itself. It seems to me, then, that it is easier to account for Mark originally putting the explanation of the parable of the sower in the wrong place than for Matthew doing so, unless he were copying Mark; it is easier to suppose that Matthew omitted the detached sayings in this discourse because he knew he had parallels to them elsewhere in his sources than to suppose that Mark inserted them relying upon an inaccurate remembrance of what he had read elsewhere in various parts of Matthew.

The conclusions, then, which Dom Chapman draws from a comparison of Mark iv and Matthew xiii (the foundation stone of his edifice) do not appear to be justified. As he himself says, 'Other explanations may be invented, no doubt,' to which I would add 'and more probable ones.'

Dom Chapman uses the account of the healing of Jairus' daughter to illustrate his belief that Mark is enlarging Matthew by adding details which

he derived from the lectures delivered at Rome by St. Peter. Mark is much the fuller: he uses 376 words where Matthew uses 135, but of these 59 are from Mark, which shows that the two accounts cannot be wholly independent.

> 'If Matthew uses Mark,' he says, 'he again extracts little bits, omitting large chunks between them. This looks impossibly clever, as he has extracted a coherent and clear story.'

But why impossibly clever? Surely if a writer is curtailing and condensing a narrative, it is no hard matter for him to produce a coherent and clear story by eliminating what seem to him unnecessary details. The only details in Matthew's narrative not derived from Mark are the mention of flute players and the statement that the rumour of the cure went out into all that country.

To me this episode appears to be a good instance of the way in which Matthew abbreviated Mark. A very real difficulty which Dom Chapman's theory raises is noted by Monsignor Barton in his introduction, the improbability that St. Peter would use the Greek Matthew or include Matthew in any form. The explanation he offers is that

> 'it is exceedingly likely that he would be willing to refresh his memory when preaching on matters which had taken place a number of years before.'

Of course it is impossible to prove either that St. Peter did or did not do something of this kind, but it is a conjecture which seems to me exceedingly unlikely to be correct, and the mere fact that a conjecture of this kind has to be resorted to in support of a theory about the composition of the Gospels inclines one to think that the theory itself is unlikely to be correct also. To show that Mark contains only the Witness of Peter he points out that

> 'he omits all incidents at which Peter could not have been an eye witness. He also omits incidents which are to the honour of Peter.'

He has however to admit that Peter might have been present at the healing of the Centurion's Servant and has to fall back on the rather lame explanation that 'it was natural Peter should omit this incomplete account.' But it is not easy to see why Matthew's account of this miracle is more 'incomplete' than his account of the healing of Jairus' daughter.

Again I find it impossible to believe that any writer, other than one adapting and interpolating a narrative of an earlier writer, could have inserted the account of the death of Judas between the statement that Christ was handed over to Pilate and the account of his trial by Pilate. Yet Dom Chapman reckons it a Marcan omission. Or to take another instance, why should Mark have omitted the account of Pilate washing his hands? It can hardly be because Peter was not present, for if so why does he not omit the whole account of this trial? I call attention to this merely because it shows that Peter's absence will not satisfactorily account for the presence of certain incidents in Matthew which are not to be found in Mark.

Now let us consider a still more striking fact; the sealing of Christ's Tomb and the setting of the watch. This occurs in Matthew only; and it is extraordinarily difficult to find a plausible reason for Mark and Luke omitting it, if they were using Matthew as one of their sources. To many it seems that the probable explanation is that neither Mark nor Luke knew the story (or if they knew it did not accept it) and that it is not an account of a historical fact, but an attempt to counter the Jewish slander that the disciples came by night and stole the body of Jesus. Such an explanation must inevitably be rejected by a Roman Catholic writer, for it implicitly denies the inerrancy of Holy Scripture which he is bound to maintain, but it is not on that account necessarily false or even improbable.

Dom Chapman has a short but interesting Chapter on the impossibility of Q. If by Q is meant one common Greek source used by Matthew and Luke which contained all the matter found in both of them which is not found in Mark, he is I believe right. Both the nature of its contents, as Harnack and others have reconstructed it, and the greatly varying degree of agreement in the passages which Matthew and Luke are assumed to have borrowed from it render it highly improbable that such a document ever existed. He also points out very truly that some of Christ's sayings may have been and probably were preserved in more than one form, which will account for Matthew having a saying, the substance but not the wording of which is also found in Luke. The parable of the lost sheep is perhaps the best instance of this. He does not however consider the question whether the considerable differences between the wording of certain sayings found in Matthew and Mark may not be due to Matthew following one tradition and Mark another. There are several passages in which Matthew seems to me to be conflating the Marcan form of a saying with a form found also in Luke; notably in the parable of the mustard seed and in the passage about casting out demons. If I am correct in this supposition it tells heavily against the theory that Mark is dependent on Matthew.

His account of the composition of Mark's Gospel is as follows.

> 'It would seem that *St. Peter is the real author, that he is addressing Gentile Converts, that he gives only what he himself remembers, that he omits whatever he thinks unsuitable to Gentiles. That he uses our actual Greek M. as his textbook, that he reads out of it, in his own wording, whatever he has chosen, in conversational language, with much addition, with many verbal repetitions and all the vividness of personal recollection.* Mark is present and takes the lectures down, as far as possible in shorthand. He preserves carefully the redundancies, the pleonasms, the historic present . . . . '

It is manifestly impossible to prove the falsity of an imaginative reconstruction, such as this, of what may have happened, but I emphatically deny that 'the internal evidence seems to demand it.' To me as to Loisy, the internal evidence seems to demand that Mark is based partly on written

sources, and is a composite book and not a transcript of shorthand notes of lectures. In the Journal of Theological Studies (April, 1933) I showed that Mark xiv, 1—xvi, 8 could be divided into two self consistent and continuous narratives of the passion, and if there is anything in my argument, the composite nature of Mark is established, and the 'redundancies and pleonasms' adequately accounted for, as they are likely to occur when a writer is combining two independent narratives of the same events.

Further, it seems that the account of the women at the Sepulchre in Mark is very difficult to explain if it is Peter's adaptation of Matthew's narrative. Peter was not present, so the variations cannot be due to his personal recollections. In Mark we read 'they said nothing to any man,' in Matthew 'they ran to tell the disciples' and though Matthew does not say in so many words that the women delivered the message, verses 7 and 10 taken in conjunction with verse 16 clearly indicate that he intended to imply that they did. Again we notice the mention of Peter by name in Mark xvi, 7, though his name does not occur in the parable in Matthew. Yet Dom Chapman urges that the frequent omission of Peter's name in Mark when it occurs in Matthew is due to Peter's modesty.

Dom Chapman's theory with regard to the composition of Luke is interesting. He thinks that Luke 'did not meet with the Greek Matthew till his own Gospel was already roughly written and complete, out of Mark and his own collections. He then added in a great quantity of Matthew in short bits, and finally cut out a large quantity of doublets or quasi doublets to shorten the whole.' The theory has this merit, that it does account for agreements in wording of Matthew and Luke against Mark in passages where all three are parallel. It suffers, however, from one great difficulty—it leaves unexplained the grave discrepancies between Matthew and Luke in the opening and closing portions of their Gospels—the places where they were not following Mark; for it seems clear that whatever the lost ending of Mark may have been (if it ever existed at all) Matthew and Luke cannot both have preserved the substance of it. Some of the instances Dom Chapman gives to prove Luke's dependence upon Matthew are unconvincing, *e.g.* in the account of the visit of Christ's mother and brethren the only important agreement of the other two against Mark is the word 'stand' (Matthew xii, 47; Luke viii, 20). But here the textual evidence for the omission of Matthew xii, 47, is very strong. The agreements in the parable of the mustard seed are more striking but in my opinion are better explained by the supposition that Matthew is conflating the Marcan form of the parable with the form used also by Luke than by the supposition that Luke used Matthew. The difficulties in the way of believing that Luke used Matthew seem, then, to be at least as great as the difficulties of believing that their resemblances are due to the use by both of a common source or sources.

The agreements of Matthew and Luke against Mark present a problem of which, as far as I am aware, no entirely satisfactory solution has yet been found. Dom Chapman's view that Luke used Matthew in the final redaction of his Gospel, does not help to solve it, for he states emphatically that 'Luke never corrects Mark by Matthew.' If this be so, then in places where *prima facie* Matthew and Luke are dependent on Mark, their agreements against him must be explained otherwise than by Luke's use of Matthew. Several suggestions have been made, *e.g.* that Matthew and Luke had before them a recension of Mark slightly different from that from which all extant copies of that Gospel derive; that the texts of Matthew and Luke have in transmission been assimilated; that many of the agreements are due to corrections which two men might have made independently. But these suggestions do not entirely remove all the difficulties.

The summing up he gives of his theory of 'How St. Luke wrote his Gospel' must be given in full, for it is an excellent example of the manner in which he reconstructs history—an example of what he justly calls 'Romantic Criticism' (p. 179).

> 'All these insertions from Matthew produced a very long book, possibly 3,100 verses, scarcely enough for two volumes, too much for one. We have some matter to go upon for conjecture as to the course of events, and for yet more "romantic criticism."
>
> 'The published has been approached, I suggest, with the original draft, and agreed to take it. He is in haste to bring it out. Hence St. Luke hurriedly makes his extracts from Matthew and inserts them in any fairly suitable place: but we observe some want of care. The sequence is frequently abrupt and obscure; the context has been hastily chosen less for the sense than because some similar word occurs. Doublets have resulted from inserting out of Matthew verses which Mark has already taken over. But alas, the work has grown too long. Luke had not inserted the longer parables of Matthew, yet when he went to the publisher the latter cried out. He had promised to publish one volume of 40,000 words (2,500 *stichoi*) and here are 50,000. "As you are a good customer I will go up as far as 2,800 stichoi, but not a line more. I must have it back in two days. My reader tells me that you have inserted stories which are very much alike. The scribes are waiting." And so the poor author goes home, as so many authors have done, to slash his manuscript and smooth over the gaps, and brings it down to just under 2,800.
>
> 'Perhaps this is not quite what happened. But, was it not something of that sort? "Romantic Criticism" cannot arrive at the truth, but it may suggest a tale of the same kind as the undiscoverable facts. What really happens is unlikely and unexpected and accidental; and that cannot be guessed.'

The only comment I can make on this passage is that I find it hard to understand how so fine a scholar and in many respects so able a critic can have thought it worth while to write so grotesque and improbable a piece of fiction. To call it 'Romantic Criticism' does not make it any better.

We cannot here discuss in detail Dom Chapman's belief that the Greek Matthew is a translation of an original Aramaic Gospel. He assumes that when Papias speaks of the *Logia* he means 'Gospel,' a disputable interpretation, and cites a number of words and phrases which seem to him to prove that the Greek Matthew is a translation. We will only consider one instance, the use of the word *amen* which occurs over thirty times in Matthew and only six times in Luke; but of the six places in which Luke uses it four have no parallel in Matthew. It would seem, then, not improbable that Luke derived it from one of his sources which was not Matthew. The explanation of the Aramaisms in Matthew is then just as likely to be that the compiler used an Aramaic source, or a Greek version of one, as that the Gospel as a whole is a translation from the Aramaic.

In conclusion I would say that those, who regard the inerrancy of Scripture and the belief that Matthew was written by an apostle and eye witness as postulates which may not be denied or even questioned, will find much in the book to support their belief. But those who do not accept these opinions as postulates will, I expect, lay down the book with a feeling of regret that so able and learned a man should have spent his time and labour in producing what must seem to them a monument of mis-directed energy.

E. R. Buckley.

Polstead Rectory,
Colchester.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASES OF THEISM*

The publication of this volume will be welcomed by its author's friends as an assurance of his recovery from illness, to which its delayed appearance is due, and by the larger circle of persons that is but acquainted with his previous writings. The book is an expansion of the Hibbert Lectures delivered by Dr. Dawes Hicks in 1931. It is designed, he tells us, primarily for the general reader, and its subject-matter is handled 'in an unconventional manner.' Hence it is not a stiff book, presenting reasoning such as is difficult to follow or the exposition of which is in technical terms unfamiliar to others than proficient students. But it is not on that account by any means a slight work: though adapted to the general reader it is a contribution to the weightier literature concerned with philosophical theology. I am to so large an extent in agreement not only with the main conclusions of the author but also with the reasoning by which he arrives at them, that I fear I am deprived of the capacity to render him the kind of service which a writer most eagerly wishes to receive from a reviewer, *viz.* the submitting of one's grounds for differing from him: as a critic I can scarcely do more than indicate a few instances in which a sceptic's doubts and difficulties, of the kinds discussed, do not seem to be completely anticipated and met.

* *The Philosophical Bases of Theism.* By G. Dawes Hicks, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., F.B.A. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd. 1937. Pp. xv, 271. 8/6 net.)

Almost all of the lectures constituting this volume deal with the approaches to theism from religious experience and from knowledge of the world and man. The second of them, entitled ' Man's Place in Nature,' contains observations on the limits of the theory of evolution, amongst other topics, and, though not without relevance to the main inquiry, this lecture stands somewhat apart from the others. Dr. Dawes Hicks accepts the theory of evolution as applied to the human body but repudiates the view that human mentality is the outcome of natural and continuous development from animal mentality. He recognises that the enormous difference between the human and the anthropoid mind is ' largely ' due to the acquisition of language ; and perhaps the word ' largely ' here, as implying ' not wholly,' is especially significant as indicating the ground of his rejection of mental evolution. For he does not take account of the suggestion that articulation, or ability to use words in place of gestures, was the consequence of an ' accidental ' variation in the structure of the anthropoid larynx. *If* this possibility cannot be ruled out, and *if* the acquisition of speech (rendering communication, the ' common standpoint,' common knowledge, rationality and conscience possible) be the sole determinant of man's advance from anthropoid experience to science, religion, etc., the naturalist's theory remains tenable. It is the latter ' if ' that seems the more disputable. For articulation might yield only words having little more significance than gestures, and the coinage of words efficacious for the acquisition of abstract thought or rational knowledge may well be dependent on the capacities and potentialities, or on the subjective states and acts, of the kind of *ego* concerned ; and there is neither any ground for the assumption that the soul* of the anthropoid is of the same nature and rank as the soul of man nor any empirical evidence that the human soul is evolved, by variation and selection, from the soul of the brute—which would imply traducianism. It would seem that it is by this latter line of thought, which is not mentioned by Dr. Dawes Hicks though his usage of the word ' largely,' to which attention has been called, *may* involve reference to it, that we can more surely reach the conclusion that the continuous evolution of human rationality from anthropoid mentality is unproven and, indeed, must remain unproven so long as the origin of the soul is a matter beyond the ken of science.

Save for an effective criticism of the positivism of Comte and his followers and of the more recent humanism represented by some American writers, as examples of false anthropomorphism, the rest of this second lecture is devoted to various shortcomings of ' scientific naturalism.' By this term the author chiefly means conclusions reached by procedure on the assumption that Nature, regarded as inclusive of man, is a sum-total of

*The word ' soul ' is a bugbear to many psychologists. But it will suffice if, in this context, the reader take it to connote the connecting-thread, which is fact whatever be its nature, in virtue of which a series of mental occurrences constitute one mental life which belongs to one self alone.

' objects,' the links of connexion between which are external or mechanical. The naturalism here contemplated does not seem to include materialism—the denial that there are subjects—since ' object ' is defined as ' that which stands over against a conscious subject in the relation of knowing '; it is rather of the kind which, allowing subjects and minds to exist, treats them as if on a par with objects, or as no more than objects, and consequently ignores the more significant characteristics of subjectivity. Such naturalism is not nowadays so common, at least in academic circles, as it formerly was; and there are some who would be willing to subscribe to the author's strictures upon it and yet call themselves naturalists.

In Lecture III the tracing of the development of human experience, begun in Lecture I, is continued, and religious experience in particular henceforth receives consideration. The teaching of Schleiermacher is naturally first examined as one of the more exhaustive and historically important expositions of the view that there is an immediate consciousness of Deity. Of the many reviews of this philosopher's doctrine I know of none which can compete with that which Dr. Dawes Hicks here presents in respect of conciseness, lucidity, and seizure of the salient and vital points. The earlier formulation of Schleiermacher's view asserts that there is direct ' acquaintance '—to use a more recently adopted term—with the Infinite and the Eternal, within the finite (as distinct from ' knowledge about ' Deity) yet involving contemplation and feeling. But, as Dr. Dawes Hicks points out, contemplation involves knowing-processes; and the universe as a whole, which is the object of such contemplation, is only to be grasped, if if can be grasped at all, by conceptual thought and rational reflexion. Hence such acquaintance-knowledge as Schleiermacher would claim is impossible. And when, later, he sought to define religion as a feeling of absolute dependence, he overlooked, as is here observed, that feeling alone, apart from cognition, etc., cannot constitute a phase of consciousness, and that the phrase ' absolute dependence ' is nonsense unless it implies a reality, to some extent known, on which to depend. Feeling is not cognition of ' feelables,' it might be said; and the word ' feeling ' is a misnomer if it is bestowed on a cognitive act such as immediate intuition. Moreover such so-called immediate intuition as is invoked by Schleiermacher and the school of which he is a typical representative is, as the psychologists have taught us, really a matter of complex mediation; and the author's clear and simple demonstration of this truth should convince persons whom more elaborate and technical expositions have failed to impress. An examination of mysticism, with its similar claim to immediate apprehension, brings the third lecture to a close.

In the succeeding lecture Dr. Dawes Hicks points out that the frequent assertions of the incapacity of reason to apprehend and comprehend the Divine are largely due to faulty conceptions concerning the nature of reason,

such as that reason is only concerned with abstractions, or with analytic processes to the exclusion of synthetic operations. He passes on to criticise Otto's attempt to find the essential characteristic of religious experience in something separable from rational and moral elements, and then maintains that all theories of religious experience such as would see its basis in feeling, immediate intuition, mystical illumination, or a non-rational numinous faculty, involve a view as to the immanence of God in Nature and man that is incompatible with genuine theism. What are objects of God's contemplation, approval, etc., are confounded with phases in His thinking, feeling, etc., and error is incurred if He is supposed to be immanent in the world in the same way that beauty or goodness is immanent in things or men. Still greater is the error when divine immanence is understood to consist in God's thinking in us or our thinking in Him; for it is of the essence of a subject or self that it cannot *eoleben* another subject's acts and states. Nor can we know the mind of any other subject, human or divine, in the same way as that in which, by introspection, we know of our own. So, it is concluded, awareness of God can only be mediated through His self-manifestations in the world and man.

The remaining lectures are devoted to discussion of the chief types of theistic argument based on knowledge of the world and man. The cosmological, teleological, moral and ontological ' proofs ' are here once more reviewed, and, hackneyed subjects as they are, Dr. Dawes Hicks has found it possible to make some fresh observations concerning them. For the faulty types of cosmological argument which would apply the category of cause, applicable only to objects within the world, to the world as a whole, or which involve the idea of creation in time, the following form is substituted. Either the world with its particular nature is just inexplicable brute fact or there is a self-explanatory real existence beyond Nature, inscrutable to science. The former alternative, Dr. Dawes Hicks submits, implying that mystery subsists at the very core of reality, is not compatible with the faith of science. Science always proceeds with the conviction that what, at any stage of knowledge, is brute fact is nevertheless rationally explicable; and unless brute fact is ultimately intelligible the guiding principle of science must be illusory. Hence the latter alternative is philosophically preferable. As to the coerciveness of this argument it may be remarked that the self-explanatoriness of the world-ground, requisite to remove mystery or mere ' brutality ' from the core of reality, must be of a different kind from the explanatoriness of science, and consequently of a kind to which the faith of science does not apply; it differs, one might say, as reasonableness differs from rationality, or as Leibniz's ' sufficient reason,' necessary to account for contingent facts, differs from the principles of identity and contradiction, being in fact a teleological principle involving the consideration of value. The form given by the author to the cosmological argument, with

its concentration on intelligibility of a certain kind, rather seems to convert the cosmological into a teleological argument; and then perhaps further considerations concerning the adaptations exhibited by the world need to be taken into account before Hume's objection (quoted on p. 182), ' why may not the material universe be the necessary existent Being? '—which is a *logical* possibility—can be met.

The teleological argument for theism is next considered; not in its cumulativeness or many-sidedness, but in respect of ' two sets of facts that are of singular impressiveness—on the one hand, the adaptation of inorganic nature to life . . . and on the other hand, the peculiarities of living organisms as such.' As usual, the author's argumentation is here lucid and forcible. It ends with an application of the idea of ' emergence ' to the problem of the origin of the soul.

The mode in which, in Lecture VII, the moral argument is presented is partly dependent on the author's choice of particular meanings for the variously used terms ' being,' ' existence,' and ' reality.' He would include in ' reality ' what some have sharply distinguished from ' reality ' as ' validity ' or ' subsistence,' and would restrict ' existence ' to ' being in time.' This is but a question of verbal convention, but the moral argument receives the following expression (p. 238):

> ' I do not say, as some have said, that the moral ideal must exist in the mind of God, because as an ideal it does not seem to me to be an existent, either in a mind or elsewhere. I would, however, submit that only on the assumption of the existence of a mind by whom it is known in its entirety and on whom its reality is dependent can we rationally think of this ideal as subsisting at all. An absolute moral law is conceivable only on the supposition that it has its ground in an existent Being who is supremely good.'

It is not stated whether it is in virtue of its absoluteness (either in the sense of independence of human cognition and valuation or in the sense of involving the unconditional or categorical imperative) or in virtue of its being a moral, as distinct from other kinds of ideal, that the moral ideal can only subsist at all if it should subsist in, or be grounded in, a mind. If it be in virtue of its moral quality, some reason is required why an ideal of the ethical kind alone, rather than ideals of other kinds, requires to be ' housed in ' the Divine Mind in order to subsist; if it be in virtue of its absoluteness that the moral law presupposes the Divine Mind, a reason is required why that law rather than the similarly absolute logical law of contradiction requires to be grounded in a supreme Being. However far one may otherwise concur with Lotze as to there being no '*prius* of law' and as to laws being dependent on the determinate nature of God, one shrinks from regarding his doctrine as including the principle of contradiction. Even God cannot be conceived as capable of being existent and non-existent at the same time. But if one absolute law be independent of the being and nature

of God, it does not seem that it can be in virtue of absoluteness alone that the moral law can necessarily presuppose a divine ground. Thus one could wish that fuller and more explicit exposition were here given to the author's thought.

In the concluding lecture Dr. Dawes Hicks reviews typical statements of the ontological argument, and goes on to criticise absolute idealism as represented by Hegel and T. H. Green. He points out the confusion, in such philosophers, of thought-products with thinking-processes, and consequently of timeless entities with temporal activities, a confusion which issues in the conception of timeless activities—which is ' simply a contradiction in terms.' And in this connexion he expresses the perplexity caused him by certain contentions put forward by Professor A. E. Taylor in his Gifford Lectures. Good reasons are given for rejecting the notion of an eternal—*i.e.* timeless—consciousness and also the pantheistically inclined doctrine of the inclusion of finite minds in the absolute or universal Mind. This chapter is one of the most valuable in a valuable work.

F. R. Tennant.

SUCH AS HAVE NEED OF MILK *

It is in many ways a more difficult task to popularize the results of learning, whether it be philosophical learning or scholarship, than to pursue learning itself. In these two books we have good examples of what may be done for a popular audience in both these departments of learning. The lectures on the Epistles from Captivity, which form the bulk of Dr. Karney's book, were delivered in Winchester Cathedral. It is not easy to expound such a work as Colossians to a popular congregation if the preacher's intention is to do more than enlarge on the ethical exhortations that are there contained. But the Bishop is not daunted by the difficulty, and leaves nothing unexplained. He boldly tackles the ' Colossian heresy,' tells his hearers something about what Gnosticism meant, and its relation to modern Theosophy, and he even discusses so difficult a term as ἐθελοθρησκεία. Occasionally he attempts a paraphrase in modern speech: ' Do not let false teachers, spiritual highbrows, boasting of their wisdom, delude you into thinking they have anything to add to the Gospel. They claim to have plucked the best blooms from every religion and to present you with the bouquet.'

On the most disputed passages—the ' Christological ' illustration in Philippians, and the πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως, perhaps Dr. Karney accepts the orthodox interpretations in too facile a manner; but perhaps that is better than to attempt a full discussion when there is not sufficient time for it. In the lectures on Philemon there is a full and frank discussion of ancient slavery and the reason why St. Paul acquiesced in the custom.

* [*An Ambassador in Chains.* By the Right Rev. Arthur Karney, D.D., Bishop of Southampton. (Mowbray. 5/-.) *The Courage of God.* By Rev. H. K. Luce, B.D., Headmaster of Durham School. With Foreword by the Dean of St. Paul's. (Skeffington. 3/6.)]

The little volume by the Headmaster of Durham School exhibits the quality which its title bears. His object is to justify the use of such a phrase as 'The courage of God,' and he deals with the subject in three parts; first the philosophical aspect, then a historical review of courage as a quality exhibited in the life of Jesus, and lastly an exhortation to his readers to follow that example.

In the first section Mr. Luce places in the forefront a quotation from Canon Streeter's *Reality*, where he justifies anthropomorphism by the illustration of how we ascribe personality, by analogy, to a dog with 'a large *minus* quantity appended.' Similarly we should ascribe it to God 'with a large *plus*.' This argument is sound, but we must not press the analogy too far, and exalt the relative into the absolute. We speak indeed of God as 'just, merciful, loving,' and rightly; but because we speak of the love of God, should we be justified in attributing faith and hope to him too? It would lead so easily to the conception of the limited struggling God of H. G. Wells; and whatever may be the advantage of such a view, it raises more difficulties that it solves, and certainly is not reconcilable with the Christian tradition.

The section on the courage of Jesus is admirably done; in fact it is the best part of the book. The 'paraenetic' conclusion is marred by the intrusion of too much poetry. It is always good to quote poetry when there is some inevitability about the quotation, so that it really clinches the argument. But when it is forced in, then the general effect is weakening.

GUY KENDALL.

WHAT IS ART?*

There exist to-day various competing views of Art as of most other things. For example, there is the psychological view which regards it as a form of self-deception—a retreat from reality into fantasy. A man fills up empty spaces with patterns because empty spaces make him feel uncomfortable (though this omits to explain why one man's patterns are good and another's bad). Other more or less physiological theories account for Art in terms of glands and so forth. Shakespeare and Mozart are products of an enlarged pituitary.

On the other hand there are those, and Miss Bulley is of their number, who believe that Art is, or ought to be, the revelation of something real. They say too that one of its products—perhaps a by-product (just as happiness is a by-product of life), is beauty. And then the question arises, What is beauty? And the psychologists and physiologists have their answers for this too. Thus the topic of Art affords ample scope for discussion; too often ,it is to be feared, profitless.

If we are to have recourse to classifications, Miss Bulley is an idealist in her view of Art. She holds that we have to deal with a world of reality

* *Art and Understanding.* By Margaret H. Bulley. (Batsford. 15/-.)
The Problem of Art. By Canon Peter Green. (Longmans. 6/-.)

which is spiritual, and a world of appearance which is material. The former is good, true, and permanent, and outside time and space, while the latter is combined of good and evil, truth and error. Works of art necessarily belong to the second of these two worlds, since they are themselves material structures; but works of art, when genuine, are symbols of the spiritual world that lies outside time and space. Miss Bulley offers this outlook as a working hypothesis; a point of departure from which every man can set out to investigate art for himself. In her book the hypothesis is illustrated in all its main points by reference to actual works of art, of which there are no less than 275 admirable reproductions. Her book is thus a good practical guide to the appreciation of Art—especially of the visual arts.

Her theory is in essentials the same as that outlined by Vincent van Gogh in a letter to his brother:

> 'To try to understand the significance of what the great artists, the serious masters, tell us in their masterpieces, *that* leads to God. One man has written or told it in a book, another in a picture.'

Canon Green's book is more of the nature of a handbook on Aesthetics. He takes a lower view of Art than does Miss Bulley, since he is contented with Oscar Wilde's definition of its specific aim and purpose: 'Emotion for the sake of emotion is the aim of Art.' This is typical of Wilde's general outlook, which was superficial beside that of van Gogh, compared with whom Wilde was a dilettante. Would Canon Green subscribe to the dictum that 'Emotion for the sake of emotion is the aim of religion?' The two propositions are exactly parallel. Many would heartily subscribe to both—but both are fundamentally alien to the rational and Christian tradition.

It is true that Art affects the emotions, and is an indispensable trainer of them. But the same is true of religion. Art and religion both educate our emotions—which is precisely why it is disastrous if our schools neglect either. But both art and religion do more than this; they also reveal reality to us. That indeed is their primary function; though it is true too that until our emotions *are* educated, we cannot perceive that truth.

J. C. Hardwick.

CATHOLICS AND THE PAPACY*

It is a pleasure to be able to commend a book written by a Roman Catholic on a matter of Catholic practice. *The Pope in Politics* is a study of the present Pope (Pius XI). It is a well-written and well-informed account of a period which is as alive with difficulties as it is full of interest to the Christian reader. We do not always agree with the point of view of the author but his fearless approach commends itself to our sympathetic understanding.

Only a Roman Catholic could possibly deal adequately with the questions which this book raises, for it takes us into the innermost

* *The Pope in Politics.* By William Teeling. (Lovat Dickson. 294 pp. 1937. 7/6.)

chambers of the Vatican and examines its policy and its politics with an insight which no outsider could possess. The writer speaks of himself on more than one occasion as a loyal member of his Church who, while accepting unreservedly the religious authority of the Pope, feels free to criticise the political influence of the Vatican. His first cousin was the only non-Italian Catholic to be made an officer in the Pope's *Noble Guard*.

The book is quite definitely an apologia for democracy and an indictment of the Papacy for its consistent disregard of democratic claims. It opens with an interesting criticism of the election of the present Pope. The criticism concerns its unrepresentative character. Whereas in the Old World, the Catholic percentage of population has decreased rather than increased, 'to-day, the membership of the Catholic Church in the New World nearly equals the entire Catholic population of the Old World' (p. 147). But in spite of this, the conservative regulations of the Vatican make it impossible for any Cardinals from the New World to be present at the election of the new Pope. Mr. Teeling is uneasy as to what may be the American Catholic attitude if again kept out at the next election; for not only have these regulations remained in force, but

> 'by the concordat with Italy, no Bishop shall be appointed to an Italian See unless he is approved of by the Fascist State, and it remains unlikely that anybody but an Italian will be elected in the coming years to be Pope as long as the Papacy remains a fixture in Rome' (p. 26).

A sidelight upon what *may* happen is perhaps given by Mr. Teeling's account of the National Catholic Welfare Conference which meets in Washington to discuss various religious matters:

> 'Rome never looked on it with great favour, and immediately after the death of Benedict XV it was announced that Pius XI had signed a decree dissolving this body, because it was one of the decisions made by Pope Benedict just before he died, and the new Pope wished to honour all the late Pope's last decisions. There is every reason to believe that this was not the case, and that the documents purporting to cover this decision were slipped in amongst Pope Benedict's papers immediately after his death, unknown to Pope Pius' (p. 150).

The sequel is interesting, for apparently, after further enquiry, the new Pope took the unprecedented step of counteracting his own order, and of allowing the Council to continue, subject to the regulation that it 'should not meet too often, not even necessarily once a year.' However, 'in spite of the Pope's suggestions, they meet regularly once a year' (p. 157). Apparently, while Rome is determined to keep the New World under its strict supervision, the New World has ideas of its own and is well able to look after itself.

Perhaps the most interesting chapters in the book are those dealing with the Pope's attitude to Italy and, in particular, his attitude to Abyssinia. No question in recent years has brought such a decrease in

the Pope's moral authority as this. All over the world, Protestants and Catholics alike expected to hear from the Vatican some sort of protest against the atrocities of Addis Ababa, and they waited in vain. 'There was no small stir . . . what was because of Peter'—but, this time, the stir was not *among the soldiers* for they knew that to a very large extent, the Vatican had already thrown in its lot with Mussolini.

Mr. Teeling makes clear the extremely difficult position in which the Pope found himself; but he does not thereby excuse or justify him. He explains that most of the mistakes of the Papacy can be traced to one dominant passion—the Pope's fear and hatred of Communism. This has guided his policy in regard to Spain and Italy and has shaped his organisation of 'Catholic Action' in every country. It was also the controlling interest in the Lateran Treaty which he concluded with Italy:

> 'Pius XI, terrified of Bolshevism, saw in Mussolini a worth-while weapon to fight it' (p. 120).

But this same Lateran Treaty made the Papacy practically an Italian servant, and its mouth was effectually closed against any criticism of Italian policy. By the Lateran Treaty, Pius XI received

> 'seven hundred and fifty million lire in cash and one billion lire worth of Italian Government stock, which latter sum he guaranteed not to sell out for a number of years. . . . The Pope, therefore, became interested in the well-being of the new Italian State to the extent of two billion lire. . . . Previously, nobody could have accused the Pope of being in league with Italy. But now, surrounded by that great nation, it seemed almost certain that unless the Pope took clear action against Italy, he would almost always be accused of being pro-Italian, and in actual fact, that is what has happened' (p. 125).

There is a certain humour after all this, in the statement towards the end of the book that 'The Pope must govern, not with an eye to worldly benefits, but with a definite moral outlook' (p. 210).

We have referred only to a few interesting items in a book which gives a world survey of world politics. Inevitably we disagree on occasions with the view-point of the writer. Thus the statements that 'the Catholic Church always stands for the recognition of properly constituted authority' (p. 195) and that 'no Catholic has ever been forced or even expected to follow Rome politically' (p. 6) suggest that Mr. Teeling has temporarily forgotten his history. The amazing language, for example, of *Regnans in excelsis*, the Bull by which Pius V excommunicated Elizabeth in 1570, not only aimed at deposing 'properly constituted authority' but also commanded rebellion so that Roman Catholics were forced to choose between their conscience and their political obligations.

We note also that he incorrectly refers to *Liverpool* Cathedral when he means the *Metropolitan* Cathedral, but we agree with him in regretting that vast Roman extravagance.

Mr. Teeling has been courageous enough to disagree politically with the Vatican. It may be that in time, he, or others equally well-informed, will be bold enough to disagree on social and other matters. At any rate, it is obvious from this book that Roman unity has its superficial aspects.

J. P. Hodges.

'ALL PRISONERS AND CAPTIVES'*

Mr. Leo Page has already published a book to be read by magistrates at least once a month and compulsorily (*Reynolds' News*), to wit, *Justice of the Peace*. He has followed this work with one for all who are concerned with social ideals, such people as judges of the High Court, lawyers, recorders, chairmen of Quarter Sessions, clergy, schoolmasters and social workers. Mr. Page sets out the problem of dealing with Crime after years of disciplined study and years of practical experience as a barrister, magistrate and Prison Visitor, and it would be difficult to find indefensible omissions. It is somewhat startling to be told on pp. 19 and 22 'penology forms no part of the professional education of a lawyer in this country,' and 'until its study comes to be recognised as the first duty of a judge we may find a lesson for to-day in the story of the blunders and inhumanities of the judges of 1870.' The more nearly the administration of law approximates to the highest moral sense of the general community, the less it lags behind that sense, the more wholehearted will be the obedience of the community not only to one law but to all LAW. The growth and strength of the British Empire is the result of respect for Just Law. The value of Mr. Page's book is that it seeks to procure justice for even the anti-social units of society, and by so doing to reduce crime. Though there are comparatively few criminals, yet crime and the reaction of society from crime in its own self-defence are forces which extend their toxic influences throughout the whole body of the community. Mr. Page's book is an antidote for these poisons, a prophylactic for all those to read who have to do with the social health of parishes, in town or country.

Taxation is rapidly destroying the middle classes, with the exception of Government employees, and it must be a concern for the readers of the *Modern Churchman* to estimate however roughly the enormous cost to them of Crime. The cost of the Police Forces alone is some £25,000,000. Moreover the direct money loss due to crime amounts to at least £35,000,000, and beyond all this are losses quite incalculable, but none the less real, none the less useless and heavy burdens on the community.

Mr. Leo Page crosses swords with the theories of Retribution and Expiation, and brings us close to the history of the Atonement. Theologians often appear to be profitless thinkers, but now and then their studies are seen to lie among the very foundations of practical good life as in Chapter III on 'The Aim of Punishment.' Clergy, schoolmasters and social workers

* *Crime and the Community*. By Leo Page. (Faber and Faber. 12/6. 1938.)

will be chiefly concerned with the sections of this book which treat of ' Corporal Punishment,' ' The Juvenile Court,' ' The Borstal System,' ' Juvenile Delinquency.' Mr. Page's treatment of the first of these seems to the writer particularly sane on a subject where sentiment runs amuck. His evidence given before the Departmental Committee on Corporal Punishment is given fully in Appendix III. He distinguishes rather briefly between the effect of ' beating ' on the public schoolboy, and the boy from the ' streets.' I do not feel that he is very convincing, and wonder how much he knows at first hand and over any long period about either set of boys.

In any case as every schoolmaster knows and observes — ' L'art de donner est au-dessus des bienfaits '! It is this art which is too often lacking. Even if one tends to take another view from that of Mr. Page, one must recognise that he is not a crank, or foolishly sentimental. His valuation of the reports of Probation Officers is notable, and he illustrates his insistence on the necessity of their greater use by the case of ' Benjamin,' a gentleman of twelve who has spent most of his spare time with his gang, having street battles. The Probation Officer evidently feels that it is a case of the Devil and idle hands.

Mr. Page gives 90 pages out of 390 to the morbid and sensational subject of ' Prisons,' but he is as elsewhere sane, accurate and checks the numerous official facts and figures by a keen personal observation. I think this is the only handbook in which one can find such clear and interesting descriptions of the conditions in nine different kinds of English prisons. The Prison Commissioners appear to have given him every facility, and my own knowledge of the Prison Staffs assures me that they would have carried out loyally in the spirit as well as the letter the desires of the Commissioners to afford the author every assistance. There is a good Index. The English style is very pleasant, fluent and nervous ; the paper and type are excellent ; the printer is Maclehose of Glasgow. Every parish clergyman in town or country engaged in the daily duties of visiting, interviewing, comforting, advising, encouraging and correcting will put this book down with a sense of illumination and gratitude.

W. Stanhope-Lovell.

ORIGEN ON FIRST PRINCIPLES*

An Anglican congregation to-day would not be interested by a preacher who quoted frequently from that series of Christian writers from the second to the fifth centuries known as ' The Fathers.' The somewhat excessive veneration paid to ' The Fathers ' by some churchmen of a former generation does not warrant their total disregard to-day. By one of the ' Latin ' fathers English religion has been profoundly influenced, namely Augustine ; yet the Greek fathers are more likely to be attractive to-day, especially those whom the late Dr. Bigg described as ' The Christian Platonists of

* *Origen on First Principles.* By G. W. Butterworth, D.Litt. (S.P.C.K. 12/6.)

Alexandria,' and of these the most distinguished was Origen (184-253). The main facts of Origen's life are well known. He was born in Egypt about 184; at the age of eighteen in a time of persecution he took over the dangerous responsibilities of the head of the Christian school attached to the University of Alexandria and held this post for about thirty years, when he fell foul of a domineering bishop and had to leave Alexandria; he settled at Caesarea in Palestine, where he had recently been ordained to the presbyterate and continued his work as a preacher, teacher and writer; he was tortured in the persecution that broke out in 250 and died from the effects a few years later. In this volume Dr. Butterworth presents in an attractive form a translation of Origen's theology as expressed in the *De Principiis* or *First Principles*, a translation which ought to be appreciated by those who desire to know what Origen actually taught.

In the introduction Dr. Butterworth explains how the book came to be translated into Latin by Rufinus about the year 400 when attacks had recently been made on the orthodoxy of Origen. Then follows in parallel columns a translation of such parts of the book as survive in the original Greek and of the Latin version (apparently not always accurate) of Rufinus. There are a number of footnotes, but they are arranged so as not to confuse the reader.

Origen shared the intellectual outlook of a philosophically educated Greek of the third century, and though he was more liberal than many of his Christian contemporaries, the reader must not expect him to anticipate either the historic method or the biblical criticism familiar in the present day. Origen was aware of the difficulties of the Bible if every book is interpreted literally; at that time he could not get over these difficulties by the modern view of 'Progressive Revelation'; his appeal to proof-texts both from the Old and New Testaments probably fails to convince the modern reader, and his own theory of the threefold sense of Scripture ('body, soul, spirit,' p. 275) sounds cumbrous and confusing; but at least he recognised the existence of a difficulty and was anxious to find an interpretation both reasonable and Christian.

His speculations on the deeper questions of theology must have sounded strange to many of his contemporaries, though perhaps not so startling as they would sound to the average congregation to-day; for instance, his statement that the power of God is 'limited' (pp. 129 and 323); that souls pre-exist and that the moral and other inequalities of this life are the consequences of behaviour in a previous existence (pp. 133-7 and 209); his charitable hope that all will ultimately be saved, including the 'daemons' (p. 146).

Origen claims to be orthodox; he argues with the 'heretics' of his own day and taught without bitterness or vituperation. His own view of the 'eternal generation' of the Word of God (p. 23) is in line with the view then and afterwards accounted orthodox, and it was not until long after his death that attacks were made on his memory.

Possibly those who like to be called 'simple believers' dislike his arguments and his speculations, as did the 'simple believers' of his own day; yet if Christianity is to command the respect that it claims it must be both reasonable and moral. It has been said that the Alexandrians saved Christianity from 'paganism, sensualism and fanaticism,' and of these liberally-minded 'Fathers' a high place still belongs to the attractive writer whose most important work has been made more accessible by Dr. Butterworth.

J. F. CLAYTON.

CONFIRMATION AND SEX TEACHING*

The reason or excuse for a new book of preparation for Confirmation must be that its authors have a new point of view or a special purpose. The book under review, prepared by a committee and with a foreword by the Bishops of Blackburn and Kingston, is designed for those who take Confirmation classes. It follows the usual lines and consists largely of notes and summaries. The treatment is sensible, but rather scrappy and superficial, and is much inferior to *A Modern Confirmation Manual,* by the Rev. H. K. Luce, who knows how to tackle difficult problems in a simple and interesting way, and who has rightly made the Life and Character of Jesus the centre of his teaching.

The purpose of the committee who have prepared this new book is to show how instruction in sex may be introduced into a Confirmation course. A modern teacher is likely to feel it his duty to give some guidance on this subject but not to know how to do it. The recommendations of the committee are excellent. They insist that it should be given naturally, as a part of the general course, with no reserves or suggestions that it is a special subject about which one must speak in whispers and behind closed doors. For children between the ages of eleven and fourteen, if one takes candidates so young, it should be handled in a general way, from the biological standpoint, and with boys and girls together. This helps the class to approach sex naturally. It will have been made easier if one knows how to be unembarrassed in explaining the Bible lessons in Sunday School where sex is involved.

But the question is more difficult when Confirmation candidates are over fourteen. It is then necessary to give some details of the physiology of sex, to say something about puberty, and probably to speak of its special temptation, masturbation. There is no reason why a priest who can speak of these things easily and naturally should not talk of them to his boy candidates. Phamplet 7 in the Modernist series 'Faith and Practice' entitled 'What do you think of sex?' by Dr. Douglas White, will suggest what to say. But it is necessary to find a competent woman to speak to the girls, probably a woman doctor or school teacher. One may omit the subject altogether, telling those who desire to know to go to an older friend or a doctor. But if the subject is to be handled at all, it must be handled frankly and without embarrassment. Alternatively one can leave it to a special interview with each candidate. Here, too, one must find a woman who will speak to the girls. A man is likely to be embarrassed and to have insufficient knowledge. The problem of sex instruction is difficult, but if one feels it to be one's duty to speak on it to Confirmation candidates, then this book shows one how to do it.

J. K. NETTLEFOLD.

* *Sex and Confirmation.* (S.P.C.K. 1937. Paper 1/6 net, cloth 2/6 net.)

SHORT NOTICES

'THE FAIREST LORD JESUS.'

By J. V. Moldenhawer. (Putnam. 5/- net. 1937.)

The author of this book succeeded Dr. H. E. Fosdick as minister of the First Presbyterian Church in New York. In the sixteen meditative studies of the life of Christ which compose the volume he gives us, as he tells us, not so much an essay in theology as the account of a process in his own mind whereby he has been able to reach a 'vital' and 'flexible' orthodoxy amid the contending claims of 'belligerent obscurantism' and 'shallowness and superficiality.' The title of the book gives a good idea of its character. It is written in a fervent, devotional and popular style. As informed evangelistic addresses these chapters must have exercised considerable influence on their hearers. But for a frank confrontation of the real issues raised by the scientific study of the Gospels the reader will have to look elsewhere.

C.J.W.

'RULE OF THE ROAD.'

By Anne Byrd Payson. (Putnam. 3/6. 1937.)

The *Rule of the Road* is a religious book of most unusual type in the way it treats and tells of the religious experiences of middle-class men and women in American society to-day. The author tells sincerely of her personal impact on the lives of men and women, her neighbours and friends, who are searching for God and are restless until they find Him. She relates how eventually most of these dissatisfied men and women get into right relationship with God and analyses the causes of their former alienation.

Mrs. Payson is not an adherent of the Group movement, but she formed a little group of her 'converted' friends and by a new technique of 'thought patterns' (really prayer and meditation) she worked out a way of living and effective practice which brought harmony and peace to all those who were seeking to lead better lives. Much of the unhappiness of these seekers seemed to come from having grievances. The power to forgive real and imaginary grievances had first to be attained, and this forgiving spirit which formed the starting point of a new life was hard to come by. One woman (one of Mrs. Payson's 'failures') found it impossible to forgive her husband's relations for their treatment of her, and so was a thoroughly miserable woman in spite of a good husband, good health and great wealth. One of Mrs. Payson's 'successes' was that of a rich young man who began his adult life by taking great pains to live away from his mother, whom he disliked, but by 'changing' himself together with his mother they made a happy home, not only for themselves, but also for three poor students who had no homes of their own.

The character sketches are so well done that it is like reading a fascinating novel. One not only sees the change that takes place in human lives but one sees *how* it takes place and by what power. This book enables its reader to realize how much religious aspiration and religious work exist outside the Churches. Mrs. Payson was herself led to her new way of life by reading *The Church of the Indian Road* by Dr. Stanley Jones, and it was at his suggestion she wrote her first book *I Follow the Road,* of which *Rule of the Road* is the sequel. The Rev. Pat McCormick in his Introduction to this book writes:

> 'Mrs. Payson will have nothing to do with sentimental religion; she is indeed uncompromisingly set upon deeds and not words; . . . it [*Rule of the Road*] is above all a layman's book, for it shows how the authoress has helped laymen to radiant, joyful and useful lives.'

Many of Mrs. Payson's observations possess originality. We cite but one:

'The really Christian mind doesn't generalize its sympathy; it specializes in individuals' (p. xiv). M.E.M.

'THE CHURCHES' ATTITUDE TO PEACE AND WAR.'

(S.C.M. Press. 1/-. 1937.)

This is a report by the 'Church and Nation Committee' of the Church of Scotland, and contains a useful summary of the Pacifist Position, the 'Non-Pacifist' (!) Position, and the tasks to be attempted together. There are also appendices on 'The Mind of Jesus Christ on War,' 'Conscientious Objectors,' 'The Witness of the Early Church,' 'The New Commonwealth Ideal,' 'Reform of the League of Nations,' 'Oecumenical Christian Organizations,' etc. The volume represents the most convenient authoritative summary of Christian opinions about these issues that we have yet seen.

'FROM WORLD FORCE TO WORLD FELLOWSHIP.'

By G. F. Wates. (Lindsay Press. 2/6. 1937.)

A witty and readable but rather inconsequential survey of international ethics. H.P.K.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*

SIR, THE IDEALS OF OUR PEDAGOGUES.

In the article, 'The Ideals of our Pedagogues' appearing in the February issue of the *Modern Churchman*, the following passage occurs:

> 'And how wise are the following words of Miss Gwatkin, and how much pulpit clap-trap do they render obsolete!
>
> "We have ceased to regard the conscientiously self-sacrificing person as the highest kind of saint, recognizing both the evil effect he may have upon persons who accept his sacrifices and the pharasaical pleasure he often derives from his planned well-doing. A good co-operator is a better person than one who believes it his mission in life to devote himself to the service of others." '

Few would quarrel with Miss Gwatkin in her attack upon a false idea of self-sacrifice involved in a 'martyrdom complex,' but surely to attack the idea of self-sacrifice as an ideal in personal religion is to pour out the baby with the bath water. Is not to dismiss conscientious self-sacrifice from the array of Christian virtues to deprive Christian love of any real meaning? For how is man to prove the reality of his love for others except by his willingness to put it to the acid test in the personal sacrifice that he is willing to make? And if 'a good co-operator is a better person than one who believes it his mission in life to devote himself to the service of others,' whither has the disciple vanished who was foolish enough to believe it was his duty to take upon himself his cross? Presumably to the concentration camp run by the more enlightened devotees of Social Service and the Corporate State.

JOHN M. PRESTON.

51 Bloxcidge Street,
Langley, Birmingham.
February 18th, 1938.

MR. HARDWICK'S REPLY.

SIR,

In my article I quoted Miss Gwatkin's words because they seemed to me both to be true and to need emphasizing. The reader would note, I felt sure, that Miss Gwatkin's remark is positive, not negative, in character. She does not cast discredit upon the self-sacrifice ideal, and leave it at that; she substitutes for it the more rational, and, as I think, more ethical ideal of *co-operation*.

It must not be forgotten that Miss Gwatkin is speaking as a practising educationist—that is to say she is dealing with the young, and especially with adolescent girls. It does adults like Mr. Preston and myself little harm to be told to be conscientiously self-sacrificing because we are unlikely to err on the side of excess. But to talk to idealistic young people, only too anxious to immolate themselves, about the need for self-sacrifice, seems to me dangerous and likely to lead to morbid consequences in the case of all but the totally unresponsive. We older people are only too ready to exploit the generous instincts of youth. We ourselves do not really take seriously the high ideals which we recommend so earnestly to our juniors. Few preachers that I have known have been conspicuously self-sacrificing; but the young, such is their inexperience, take us at our own valuation—a rash thing to do.

Personally, I believe that the importance of preaching to the young has been over-estimated. Most of us can recollect being the victims of much ill-considered, rhetorical, and emotional moral exhortation in our youth, and now realise that it did us harm. I would cut out all preaching to the young, save such as was instructive only—*i.e.* stating facts and defining beliefs. The ideal of co-operation can be inculcated without any preaching. Girls or boys can be set to work or play together, and by acting co-operatively their co-operative instincts are developed without their being aware of it. Thus their morality becomes unconscious and automatic, not conscious and full of effort.

That the co-operative ideal is ethically superior to the self-sacrifice ideal seems to me so obvious that argument about it is tedious. If I am to sacrifice myself, that may do me good; but what about the person to whom, or on whose account, I sacrifice myself? In many cases, he will not be benefitted ethically at all. There must always be two sides to this sacrifice business, and the spiritual benefit accruing to the respective sides is by no means equal. Many children sacrifice themselves to their parents, and parents to their children. The results are deleterious. On the other hand in co-operating everyone works together on a level, and all benefit because all are active. All receive, and all give.

Mr. Preston mentions the disciple taking up his cross. But it is clearly not so much a question of proof-texts as of common sense. So far as I can remember, our Lord did not ask His disciples to sacrifice themselves to *Him*. He asked them to co-operate with Him and with one another in announcing the Kingdom, and this would involve certain sacrifices, but that is a different matter. The sacrifices are for the Kingdom, not for a person; and all sacrifices for a 'cause' are made, in practice, by co-operating. 'For my sake and the Gospel's' is the formula used.

As for proving the reality of one's love for others; in most cases it needs no proving. Few of us ask our friends to prove their friendship by doing conspicuous acts of self-sacrifice. If it came to the point we should indeed hope that a few would put themselves out for us; but they would do it not for the sake of the sacrifice involved, but in order to get us out of

a hole. And does a husband expect a wife to sacrifice herself to him? Many perhaps do, but such are not the most successful marriages—even if the wife wants to. All the husband wants is for the wife to co-operate—a difficult enough task for anyone.

For does anyone imagine that co-operation is always easy? On the contrary, it calls for self-conquest, and detachment from personal motives. And there is little that is spectacular about it. Whereas some gesture of self-immolation appeals to our dramatic instincts. The truth is that there is a little of the exhibitionist about most of us who go in for self-sacrifice on principle.

J. C. HARDWICK.

The Vicarage,
Partington,
Manchester.
March 2nd, 1938.

WHAT IS RELIGIOUS BELIEF?

SIR,

I agree with Mr. Floyd that in the concluding phrase of my last letter it would have been better to say: 'although they fear it may prove to be an illusion.'

I had no intention of prejudging the question as to whether their doubts were justified or not. That is much too large a question for a brief correspondence. My whole point is that many people who should be inside religious organizations are excluded, because the entrance is barred by a creed.

J. H. HUME-ROTHERY.

THE VIRGIN BIRTH.

SIR,

I hoped that my letter in the February issue of this journal might tend to promote better understanding between those who hold different opinions on the subject of the Virgin Birth. I was shocked and grieved by the letter that appeared on the same page: the terms used cannot fail to hurt and, I fear, alienate many to whom the ancient tradition is very sacred. There is little hope of unity in the Church unless those who differ treat with reverence and sympathy the beliefs of fellow members.

HELEN ALEX. DALLAS.

Belle Vue,
Hurstpierpoint,
Sussex.

DR. BRADFORD'S REPLY.

SIR,

I had not the faintest intention of giving offence to anyone. I merely pointed out what appeared to me an obvious fact for the consideration of theologians.

E. E. BRADFORD, D.D.

Nordelph Vicarage,
Downham Market, Norfolk.

[The Editor of the *Modern Churchman* is of course not responsible for the views expressed by correspondents, provided that those views are significant and not anonymous and are expressed by correspondents who have a right to be heard.—ED., *M.C.*]